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State-Business Relations and Investment in Egypt
Abla Abdel-Latif and Hubert Schmitz
Summary
This study shows that informal relationships between key policymakers and
investors have played an important role in raising levels of investment and
fostering economic growth. Comparative observations show that common social
roots and common professional background facilitate the emergence of an
effective public-private growth alliance but the only necessary conditions are
common interest and common understanding of the problems to be solved.
The comparative research on two old and two new sectors shows in detail how
informal relationships have emerged and how they have made an impact but it
warns against overstating their investment-enhancing role. Effective relationships
between policymakers and investors – abbreviated to CIPI – are not the direct
cause of increases in investment but can play a critical role in unleashing the
profit potential of specific sectors. Research on the food industry shows how CIPI
helped to overcome supply constraints and political obstacles in decision-making.
Research on the communications industry shows how CIPI helped Egypt to
overcome initial barriers to entry and establish a new industry virtually from
scratch. While the gains were sometimes appropriated by a few actors, the
research shows that exclusive relationships can have inclusive effects, depending
on how the private sector is organised. 
Quantitative examination of whether CIPI had an enduring investment-enhancing
effect was inconclusive. There is no doubt however that the CIPI was an effective
transitional arrangement. It helped investors to overcome barriers to economic
growth, it helped policymakers to overcome deficiencies in their own government
agencies and it helped both sides to work together in establishing new sector-
specific rules and improving the general regulatory framework. The general lesson
from this research is that such transitional arrangements deserve more attention,
both to gain a better understanding of the political economy of investment and
growth and to make research more relevant for policy. 
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Navigating the research report
This report presents the results of research conducted in Egypt on a topic about
which many economists and policymakers have strong views: how can private
investment be increased in an institutional and political environment that is not
conducive to such investment? There are already standard policy ʻsolutionsʼ to this
problem: ʻImprove the investment climate!ʼ is the dominant policy advice. This can
mean many things but usually concentrates on the institutional dimensions of
investment climate reform. The standard advice in such reform is that governance
through informal relationships should be replaced with governance through formal
rules. Effective regulatory reform, including legal reform, is seen as the key. We
are not suggesting that this is wrong; we believe this is a good long-term ambition.
We are however suggesting that this approach is unlikely to trigger the desired
wave of investment. It is more difficult and takes longer than is usually assumed.
This is where we are coming from. We are looking for ways forward which are
quicker and more realistic. In this report we present insights drawn from the recent
Egyptian experience. The report shows the limitations of an approach which is
hands-off and rules-based in explaining and fostering investment and the
importance of an approach which is hands-on and relationship-based for
overcoming barriers and promoting investment.
We looked at Egypt because we were aware that, in some sectors, there had
been large increases in private investment in recent years and because we had
indications that these increases were associated with close cooperation between
a relatively small number of people in government and in the industry concerned.
We wanted to find out how and why these relationships had developed, and
whether and how they led to change in the ways in which government and
business interacted, and to a substantial increase in investment. While our
research is imperfect in several senses, we believe that we have produced
evidence that should lead policymakers to widen their notion of what constitutes a
good investment climate: in some circumstances, close (particularistic) relations
between small groups of people in government and business can catalyse private
investment and produce benefits that are not exclusive to this group. 
Conducting research on these relationships was difficult because they are often
informal and because we had no template. This research report shows not just
what we found but also how we obtained the findings and where we have doubts.
What follows is a brief guide to the report. 
The report has four Parts, each of them subdivided into Sections. Part I sets out
the WHAT, WHY and HOW?
WHAT are we trying to find out? The research questions are: how can one explain
the substantial investment and growth in particular sectors and localities of
countries that are thought to have poor investment climate at the national level?
Did close relationships between government and business play a role in bringing
about this investment? How and why did these relationships emerge? What were
the key features that made them effective? The Introduction (Section 1) shows
briefly how the recent literature leads us to these questions. The questions are
then operationalised in two sets of hypotheses, one concerned with the
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emergence of the state-business relationships and one concerned with their
impact on investment. These hypotheses are set out in Section 4. Essential for
the specification of the hypotheses is the conceptual framework presented in
Section 3. 
WHY the research is important is explained in Section 1 – with reference to recent
international literature – and then further in Section 2 – with reference to Egypt. 
HOW was the research carried out? The contextual Section 2 shows that
investment in Egypt over the last ten years varied substantially between sectors
and over time. These variations open up the space for new research, which is
based on inter-sectoral and inter-temporal comparisons. Section 4 explains the
choice of sectors and how the required information was collected. While the
investment data comes from secondary sources, the information concerning
relationships is based entirely on primary sources, in particular 61 interviews with
policymakers and business leaders. 
Part II presents the findings on two old sectors: food and furniture; and Part III
presents the findings on two new sectors: communication and information
technology. Both Parts are organised around the same sets of hypotheses which
are examined one by one. They mirror each other. It is however important to
present the findings of the old and new sectors separately to make space for the
initial comparison between the two old sectors and between the two new sectors.
Each pair has one sector that did very well (food and communications) and one
sector that did less well (furniture and information technology). While not
constituting full-blown comparisons, contrasts between them are an essential part
of the analysis. Government-business relationships differed and this seems to
have had an effect on regulations and policies and ultimately on investment. The
flow in these detailed empirical sections is as follows.
Part II: The first hypothesis states that state-business relationships become
effective only when there is a common interest in the sectorʼs growth and common
understanding of its problems. We use the term CIPI to refer to relationships
which fulfil this condition of common interest and understanding. The interviews
show that CIPI exists for the food sector but less so for the furniture sector. The
effects of CIPI are examined in detail by focusing on a number of hypotheses.
One of the most important ones is the hypothesis that CIPI plays a critical role in
attracting investment to specific sectors. The report shows the difficulty of
examining this effect because the respondents were concerned that a positive
response could be interpreted as evidence of corruption. In-depth discussions
were necessary to unravel how CIPI helped reduce uncertainties and solve
chronic problems in the food sector. This had a positive documented influence on
investment. The examination of a further hypothesis shows that the way the
private sector is organised influences whether the effects are inclusive or
exclusive. Then there are further hypotheses about whether the investment
increases are just short-lived surges or give rise to a new dynamic. 
Part III: The same hypotheses are then examined for the new sectors:
communication and information technology. In a nutshell, the findings are clearer
in the new sectors because the relationships between government and business
leaders are closer. The common interest is strong and the common understanding
of the problems is helped by the fact that members on both sides have the same
professional background. The report shows that this alliance played a critical role
in generating the investment and establishing a new communications and
information technology industry. Particularly interesting is that the initial round of
investment occurred before new rules for regulating the sectors were introduced.
The investors played a major role in designing the new legislation by participating
in a public-private working group set up for this purpose. By examining specific
hypotheses and contrasting the communications and information technology
industries, the report produces new insights on how constructive state-business
relations have emerged, how they change over time and how they affect
investment decisions. All this is done in some detail but we have tried to make
complex case material accessible. Nevertheless Parts II and III (and the related
Appendix) are demanding on the reader because introducing the key players, the
(changing) institutional infrastructure and sectoral specificities is unavoidable for
providing evidence, bringing out contingences, or showing that answers to our
questions have different layers.
The hurried or impatient reader might prefer go straight to Part IV which pulls
together the findings from the old and new sectors and brings out commonalities
and differences. The most important overall finding is that informal relationships
between key policymakers and investors have played an important role in raising
levels of investment and fostering economic growth. But the report warns against
overstating this role. CIPI is not the sole or direct cause of an increase in
investment but it helps to unleash the profit potential and unblock the way forward
in the short and medium term. It has been an effective transitional arrangement.
Part IV then draws together the findings and reflections on how CIPI helped to
overcome barriers, what determines whether the willingness to take action
translates into ability to take action, under what conditions exclusive relationships
have inclusive effects, how the organisational capacity of the private sector
influences the outcomes, whether the investment increases are short-lived or take
the sector beyond the tipping point, whether and how informal relationships can
be institutionalised, and why the global financial crisis and economic downturn
reinforce the need to examine state-business relationships.
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Part I Objectives, analytical
framework and national context
1 Introduction
Generating private investment for more and better growth is one of the key
challenges for a better future. It is especially difficult in the political and
institutional environments typical of developing countries. What can their
governments do to achieve substantial increases in productive private
investment? This is the question that drives the research programme ‘Public
Action and Private Investment’ (PAPI) of the Centre for the Future State. The
study presented here is a component of the PAPI programme. 
The policy relevance of the question addressed by this programme is clear. It is
now generally accepted that substantial reduction in poverty requires accelerating
economic growth and that such growth requires increasing investment. Low levels
of private sector productive investment appear to be a major obstacle to economic
growth in the poor countries. Even though this issue has received much attention
in the academic debate in the last 40 years, solutions for developing countries
remain difficult to derive. 
In the recent policy debate, these issues are discussed in terms of improving the
investment climate. For example, the 2005 World Development Report ‘A Better
Investment Climate for Everyone’ identifies a range of obstacles and ideas for
moving forward. Many other policy documents have appeared concerned with
improving the climate for business. At their core is the suggestion that improving
the institutional framework is essential for raising investment and growth. A lot of
effort has gone into developing indicators to measure the burden of regulations.
The best known is the ‘Doing Business’ indicator (of the World Bank-IFC) which is
used to provide benchmarks, compare countries and urge governments to reform
regulations. With such quantification, it seems, attention to investment climate
issues has increased further. International conferences and workshops around the
world are trying to take stock and derive lessons. 
The protagonists of regulatory reform claim that the key to investment and growth
lies in clear property rights and low levels of regulation and that this can be shown
empirically using business indicators. The criticisms fall roughly into two groups.
First, there are those that concentrate on the measurement. They criticise the
choice of indicators, the reliability of the data, and the uses to which it has been
put (for example, Commander and Tinn 2007; IEG 2008). Or they argue that
measurement is more effective if carried out at the sub-national level – the district
or province (for example, VNCI 2007). 
The second group concentrates not on measurement but on dynamics and context,
questioning the assumption that reforming regulations is the key to raising investment
and generating growth. These critics are not against reforming regulations but
against making it the all-out focus for research and policy, suggesting that it is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for raising investment and generating
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growth (Altenburg and Drachenfels 2006; Khan 2005 and 2008; Moore and Schmitz
2008). What is necessary and appropriate is seen to depend on the circumstances.
This view is expressed most clearly in the work of Rodrik and colleagues on growth
strategies, which stresses that reform is contingent on the economic circumstances
of the country and that the binding constraints differ from country to country
(Rodrik 2005; Hausmann et al. 2007). This view has gained increasing acceptance
but the question of how best to identify the binding constraints remains wide open.1
Even more open is the question of how to overcome the constraints once
identified. This is the question which this report seeks to address. Obviously the
answer depends to some extent on what constraint one is dealing with. There are
however two general ‘lessons’ that one can derive from reading across recent
debates on enhancing growth and that provide a useful steer for this study. First,
the suggestion to draw on political and not just economic analysis; second, the
warning not to search for solutions that last forever. Let us start with the latter. 
The distinctions between short-, medium- and long-term are well rehearsed in
social sciences, but are rarely given sufficient attention in policy debates, partly
because of the preoccupation to find and adopt best practice. Best practice
thinking tends to diminish the importance of context and time. This is
acknowledged in some parts of the growth debate that recognise the importance
of (often heterodox) solutions for a particular stage or a particular turning point.
Take, for example, the transitional institutions identified by Qian (2003) in his
analysis of China’s growth trajectory. Or take the conclusion that igniting
economic growth is different from sustaining it and that igniting growth requires a
limited range of (often unconventional) measures that need not overstretch the
executive capacity of the state (Pritchett and Rodrik 2005). 
Such a step-by-step approach is also behind the questions on sequence and
dynamics of institutional reform, posed by Khan (2008) and Moore and Schmitz
(2008): does ‘getting the institutions right’ come first or do investment and growth
lead to demand for institutional transformation? In other words, do investors follow
or lead regulatory reform? Or is an iterative process at work? If so, what are the
key stages in this process? We believe these questions need to be posed
because some of the successful economies, such as China and Vietnam, have
been able to initiate investment and growth without prior institutional
transformation (Qian 2003; Malesky 2008). India’s transition from low to high
growth occurred prior to institutional reform (Kohli 2005; Rodrik and Subramanian
2004). Explicit or implicit in these analyses is the idea that there are different
requirements for different stages. As will be shown later, this has influenced the
way we have gone about the research presented in this report.
The other useful steer emerging from recent debates is the acknowledgement that
a more political and not just economic approach is required. This is significant in a
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1 Available approaches include growth diagnostics which seek to identify constraints holding back the 
economy at large (Hausmann et al. 2007) and value chain analysis which disaggregates further and 
seeks to identify the weak links that hold back particular parts of the economy (Schmitz 2005; 
Humphrey and Navas-Aleman 2009). 
debate which has tended to be dominated by economists. The acknowledgement
of politics is visible in the recent debate in and among aid agencies, in particular
in the importance given to growth coalitions (consisting of actors from public and
private sectors, and from national and foreign organisations). There is a sense
that there is plenty of advice but that little is put into practice because of lack of
political support. Growth coalitions are thought to be important to overcome the
‘implementation problem’.2 The ‘political turn’ is also visible in the academic
debate which has suggested that state-business relations matter for economic
growth. This is not a new debate: the importance of state-business relations has
been stressed in analyses of capitalism in Latin America and Asia where it has
been seen to contribute to success (see for example Amsden 1989; Evans 1995)
but also excess and failure (see for example, Winters 1996; Hutchcroft 1998).3
Neoliberalism embraced eagerly the negative experiences and the spectre of
rampant rent-seeking, and crony capitalism made state-business relations a
suspect topic in the development debate. This is now changing; there is a growing
(but often grudging) recognition that for a government that seeks to foster
economic growth it is neither realistic nor desirable to keep business at arm’s
length. The new constructive realism is visible in several research programmes
which are supported by DFID4 and which examine the relevance of state-business
relations for economic growth. For example, Sen and Te Velde (2009) suggest
that state-business relations have a positive impact on economic growth in Africa,
based on an analysis of the visible, institutionalised and formal relationships. 
While this is an important finding, the more challenging question is whether such a
positive influence comes from less visible relationships which are not (yet)
institutionalised and work informally. Even though such relationships continue to
be pervasive, a reassessment of how they affect investment and growth in
contemporary developing countries has yet to be carried out.5 This is where this
study seeks to make a contribution. The strongest evidence for the importance of
informal state-business relations for investment and growth comes from the
history of Mexico (Haber et al. 2003; Bates 2004). Inspired by this case, Moore
and Schmitz (2008) suggest that ‘hand-in-hand arrangements’ between
politicians/policymakers as holders of political power and investors as holders of
economic power need to be put centre stage in order to understand why
investment and growth can increase in adverse circumstances. They draw
attention to enormous differences that can often be found within countries and ask
how one can explain substantial investment and growth in particular industries
and localities of countries that are thought to have poor investment climates at the
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2 This is based on our own experience in receiving and giving advice on growth and competitiveness 
issues. 
3 For a useful review of state-business relations, see Schneider (1998). 
4 The research programme ‘Public Action and Private Investment’ of the Centre for the Future State; the
State-Business Relations Cluster of the Consortium for Improving Institutions for Pro-Poor Growth; 
and the Research Stream on State-Business Relations of the Africa Politics and Power Programme. 
See www.2.ids.ac.uk/futurestate/; www.ippg.org.uk and www.institutions-africa.org. 
5 The same point is made by Kelsall and Booth (2009) with particular reference to Africa. They suggest 
that the literature on clientelism and neo-patrimonialism has tended to focus on the negative effects and
that a reassessment is required, specifying the conditions that lead to positive and negative outcomes. 
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national level? Did hand-in-hand arrangements play a role in bringing about this
investment? How and when did these arrangements emerge, what stages did they
go through, what were the key factors that made them effective?
These are precisely the questions addressed in this study which investigates the
case of Egypt. Politically Egypt is a heavyweight, seen by many as the motherland
of the Arab world and strategic mediator in the conflict-ridden Middle East.
Economically it is relatively weak. While showing signs of improvement since
2004, Egypt has recorded low rates of growth and low levels of competitiveness
for a long time. External advice on how to change this was not lacking. Egypt was
at the receiving end of much donor advice on the investment climate and carried
out some reforms to improve the investment climate. The levels of private
investment nevertheless remained disappointingly low. There were however
interesting exceptions which we investigate in some depth in this study. More
recently, since a change of government in 2004, general levels of private
investment have picked up and in some sectors the increase has been particularly
strong. The central concern in this study is to understand why investment in some
sectors was so substantial (before and after 2004), paying particular attention to
the relationships between policymakers and investors. 
This concern led us to concentrate on four sectors: food and furniture (old sectors)
and communication and information technology (new sectors). We had some idea
from our previous research and advisory work that investment in these sectors
had increased substantially and that the relationships between policymakers and
investors were close. What we did not know was how the relationships had
emerged, when and how they mattered for investment, and how relationships and
outcomes varied between these sectors. This research report presents the
findings on these questions. Accordingly, the main sections of this report are
concerned with the emergence of these relationships and with their impact. 
Running through the core empirical sections is the comparison between the four
sectors. As will become apparent, this comparative dimension is critical to
understanding what worked and what did not and why. Whenever possible we
also compare ‘our’ four sectors with industry at large but we are not in a position
to do this systematically, partly because there is so much diversity and this
complexity increases when one includes changes over time. Yet capturing the
main changes over time is what we have tried to do, particularly in our four
sectors. In short, we rely on both inter-industry comparisons and inter-temporal
comparisons. Imperfect as they are, they are essential to the journey of discovery.
This is an exploratory project which is question-driven, not method-driven. 
Two issues need to be clarified from the outset. First, our focus on the relationships
between policymakers and investors does not mean that we ignore the danger of
such relationships being abused. On the contrary, in the course of this research
report we examine factors that influence whether the effects are inclusive or
exclusive. Second, our focus on public-private relationships in specific sectors does
not mean that we consider the general investment climate irrelevant, far from it.
We believe that improving the regulatory framework is a good thing to do. But the
substantial intra-country differences raise questions about the explanatory power
of an investment climate approach which concentrates on the national level, and
they lead us to look for alternative explanations. In this study, we have opted to
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 61
17
examine the relevance of what one can call ‘relationship-based governance’ in
contrast to the ‘rules-based governance’ which is the focus of investment climate
reform. In the context of this research, rules-based governance means that
investors can rely on rules such as the legal protection of property rights, the legal
enforceability of contracts and clear tax regulations to reap the benefits of their
investment. In contrast, relationship-based governance means that the above
issues are granted through relationships between business and state actors.6
Rules-based governance seems an important long-term goal. The question is how
to get there. Could it be that relationship-based governance is a means of
accelerating the process? Our research leads us to a cautious ‘Yes, but’. In other
words, we need to specify the circumstances in which relationship-based
governance can lead to more investment and more investors and create demand
for clearer and better rules.
The report consists of four Parts. Part I has four sections. Following this
introduction, Section 2 sets out the national context: it gives an overview of
investment trends and changes in rules-based governance. Section 3 provides the
conceptual framework for the analysis of relationship-based governance. Section 4
presents the hypotheses and methodology for the sectoral studies. All these
sections are short but essential to prepare the ground in terms of national context,
concepts, methodology and hypotheses. Then we come to the core of the Report.
Parts II and III present respectively the findings from two long-established sectors
(food and furniture) and from two new sectors (communication and information
technology). Both Parts show how the relationships between key policymakers
and investors emerged in the selected sectors, and what impact these
relationships had in terms of policies for these sectors and for investment. The
final Part IV distils the common patterns and the differences between these
sectors, draws out the main conclusions for the investment climate debate, and
specifies issues to be addressed in future research.
2 Rules-based governance and 
industrial investment in Egypt 
1970–2007
This section provides the national context for the sectoral studies and addresses
three questions: what have been the main trends in private industrial investment
in Egypt since the 1970s? What were the main changes in rules and regulations
over this period? Is there a relation between changes in rules-based governance
and investment? 
6 This distinction is also used by Li (2003) but for a different purpose, namely the analysis of transaction
costs between private actors, whereas our focus is on the relationships between state and private 
actors. 
There are no reliable time series data on industrial investment but by piecing
together the available data (Abdel-Latif 2007), one can derive the following overall
trends: 
 Industrial investment as a percentage of total investment has declined since 
the 1970s. Public and private industrial investment accounted for over 30 per 
cent in the 1970s and decreased to around 10 per cent in 2005. 
 Private industrial investment as a percentage of total private investment 
decreased from 26 per cent in 1992−97 to 11 per cent in 2000−03, suggesting
that the private sector was losing interest in investment in industry.
 Annual growth rates of both public and private real industrial investment have 
fluctuated enormously over the period 1970 to 1996, but the overall trend was
one of decline (see Figure 2.1). Public investment decreased more than 
private investment following the implementation of Egypt’s new economic 
reform program (ERSAP) starting from 1991. 
 Private industrial investment (in real terms) remained steady but at a low level 
from 1998 to 2002 and then declined during 2002 and 2003 due to a wave of
divestiture (Sakr 2003). A change of trend is observed starting from 2004 as 
investment increases, first making up for lost investments in the previous 
couple of years, then achieving positive rates of growth from 2005 (Figure 2.2). 
The poor investment performance over long periods does not mean that the
government failed to make changes to the regulatory framework. Tables A1 and
A2 in the Appendix list and explain the main changes. Some of them were
substantial, for example the laws ending expropriation (nationalisation) in the
1970s, the legal provision for equal treatment of local and foreign firms introduced
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Figure 2.1 Public and private industrial investment: annual growth rates,
1973–1996 (%)
Source: Ministry of Planning (currently Ministry of Economic Development)
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in the 1980s, structural adjustment in the 1990s, intellectual property and labour
laws in the early 2000s. These and other measures failed to have an impact on
private investment partly because 
 Some of them were dealt with on paper but not followed through; there were 
contradictions between new and old laws, the dispute settlement remained 
weak, and carrying out the reforms was not in the interest of an overstaffed 
and underpaid bureaucracy (El-Mezlawy 2006).
 Some areas were not dealt with at all, notably customs administration, 
taxation rules, competition law and judicial reform (Handoussa et al. 2003).
 Government was perceived to be anti-business (interviews with business 
people carried out by authors in first half of 2004). 
The resulting poor investment and growth was not just an economic problem. The
combination of a rising number of angry young people, unable to find jobs, and a
disgruntled business community, feeling that it was held back by an overblown
and often dysfunctional state bureaucracy, made the regime fear for its future.
This helps to explain why, in mid-2004, the President changed the composition of
the Cabinet in a major way. For the first time since 1952, members of the business
community were appointed to ministerial positions. The new Cabinet swiftly
introduced a number of regulatory changes, notably the simplification of customs
and of taxation. As seen in Figure 2.2, investment responded immediately. Does
this support the belief in rules-based governance? The government certainly
presents itself as a successful reformer of rules and regulations. 
A closer look suggests an explanation which has several layers. There can be little
doubt that the simplification of customs and taxation helped – the business community
had requested them for some time. But other dimensions central to rules-based
governance have not improved, notably inconsistent legislation and weak contract
enforcement. Our post-2004 interviews with owners and managers of large and
Figure 2.2 Annual growth rate of real industrial investment, 1998/99–
2005/06 (%)
Source: Ministry of Planning (currently Ministry of Economic Development)
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small enterprises suggest that the most critical change lay not in the rules for
business but in perceptions by business people (Abdel-Latif 2008). The widely
publicised membership of business people in the Cabinet led to greater trust in
government. Yousfi and Humphrey (2008) add a further layer of understanding,
derived from interviews that concentrated on perceptions. They suggest that what
mattered most were not the changes in rules but new ways of relating with
government agencies. Interviewed industrialists felt that government agencies, such
as GAFI (General Authority for Investment), had developed a capacity for dialogue
and adjustment to the constraints faced by business. The perception was that
relationships had changed from controlling with distrust to promoting with good will. 
This overview of the national context has hidden the enormous intra-country
differences. Both before and after 2004, substantial differences in investment and
growth can be observed. Figure 2.3 illustrates a sample of such differences
between industrial sectors.
Figure 2.3 Annual real investment in some of the manufacturing
industries, 1995–2008* (in million Egyptian pounds)
*data up to November 2008.
Source: GAFI – Nominal investment data deflated by authors.
A proposition that underlies this study is that a great deal can be learnt from
investigating these differences. This is why we concentrate on sectors which did
better than others and we ask whether and how this superior private investment
performance is related to public action. In order to do this we need to make our
conceptual framework explicit because it provides us with the language to
investigate what went on between private and public sectors and because it
provides us with a reference point for analysing changes in the real world. 
3 Conceptual framework
The question that drives our analysis is how we can explain that investment in
some industrial sectors increased substantially more than in others, giving
particular attention to the relationships between policymakers and investors. Such
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an exploration is made difficult by the attribution problem: investment is influenced
by a number of factors. The advantage of intra-country (as opposed to inter-
country) comparison is that the general investment climate can be held constant.
But how do we take into account the business opportunity (profit potential) as a
driver of investment? Most of the investment climate and state-business literature
chooses to ignore this question. In this study we cannot entirely resolve the
attribution problem but we will address it in the empirical analysis and specify at
what point and in which way particular state-business relationships matter. 
The purpose of this section is to spell out the conceptual framework,
distinguishing between different types of state-business relationships, different
stages they go through and different ways in which and points at which they might
have an impact on investment. 
There is no agreed terminology on state-business relationships. They range from
hostile to supportive. Support can come in two ways: through the regulatory
framework defined by the state or through arrangements with particular groups of
enterprises. We have already used this distinction in the previous sections where
we distinguished between rules-based governance and relationship-based
governance. When Moore and Schmitz (2008) refer to ‘universalistic versus
particularistic’ or ‘arms-length versus arm-in-arm’ relationships, they make
essentially the same two-fold distinction.
The words are different but the distinction is the same. For example, the
conventional investment climate reform aims at rules-based governance which
implies arm’s length or universalistic relationships between business and the state.
In this study we investigate whether and how relationship-based governance works,
which means interrogating arm-in-arm or particularistic relationships. In doing so,
we pay particular attention to the common interest between both sides. We will
refer to this relationship based on common interest between policymakers and
investors as CIPI. This is our central concept and therefore needs explaining.7
CIPI is a relationship based on mutual interest. The investor perceives that the
policymaker has a stake in the investment, in the sense that making it happen and
succeed would enhance the policymaker’s reputation, career or power. In turn, the
policymaker perceives that the investor needs assurance that complementary
action by the state (complementary infrastructure, services, loans, or policies) will
take place. Both sides would lose out if the investment does not occur. 
The hypothesis underlying this study is that CIPI is critical to stepping up
investment and growth. We seek to understand how CIPI emerges and whether/
under what conditions it has the hypothesised effect. In other words, we are not
assuming that the effect is always beneficial to the economy and we are aware
that such relationships can be, and indeed have been, abused (discussed further
in Moore and Schmitz 2008). We believe that the ‘whether, how, under what
conditions’ is best unravelled by adopting a process approach; in other words,
7 We do not use the term public-private partnership (PPI) because it comes with a lot of ‘baggage’ in the
sense of different meanings for different purposes, for example cooperation in the implementation of 
infrastructure projects. 
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observing how CIPI evolves over time and observing at what stage what kind of
effect kicks in. The problem is that the literature gives us little guidance for doing
this. We have therefore asked what the process might look like and built a model
consisting of hypothesised stages. This heuristic device gives us vocabulary and
reference points for analysing real processes. Whether real processes develop as
set out in the model, will be examined in later sections.
The dynamics of reaching CIPI and impacting on private investment is
hypothesised to evolve in seven phases: phase one − initial relations; phase two
− common interest-building stage; phase three − common interest-maturity stage;
phase four − the tipping point; phase five − the sectoral knock-on effect; phase
six − the inter-sectoral knock-on effect; and phase seven − beyond the peak of
CIPI. An attempt to capture the hypothesised phases of CIPI from birth to decay
or continuation is presented in Figure 3.1. 
The three critical phases in the whole process are phases two, four and seven:
phase two where the common interest is actually being built, phase four when the
investment starts to respond (the tipping point) and phase seven (beyond the peak)
because it addresses the future of CIPI and the possible alternative scenarios.
The detailed description and characteristics of each phase are presented in Table
A3 in the Appendix. The main elements of each phase are as follows.
Phase One prepares for the critical Phase Two of building common interest.
Common backgrounds (education, social relations etc.) between policymakers
and investors facilitate this introductory stage considerably. It speeds up the move
into the more serious Phase Two by reducing the duration, transaction costs,
ambiguity and uncertainty typically involved in testing the waters between the two
parties. Policymakers already know the private investors and so tend to trust what
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they say. By the same token, based on previous relations, the private investors
trust the promises of the policymakers even if not implemented right away. 
Note that in the real world, Phase One does not necessarily lead to Phase Two.
The reasons are: (a) key players in the private sector with vision and strategic
thinking capabilities may not necessarily emerge right away or may simply not
exist; and (b) although trusting the private investors, policymakers may not
necessarily be willing to induce policy changes of any significance, i.e. not be
willing to take any risks, and so they may not encourage the move to the next
step. 
The building of common interest in Phase Two is the most critical stage of all. It
takes place mostly in informal settings, behind closed doors, because the two
parties need to be sure of the outcome of what they are negotiating before taking
it to the public arena. Negotiations typically involve real partnership between the
public and the private sectors in the sense that the private sector promises
targets and specific responsibilities in return for policy changes by the
government. 
Phase Three is the phase when policy formulation steps out from behind closed
doors to actual public announcement and adoption. It is further enhanced if a
formal mechanism for the role played by the private sector in policy formulation is
in operation. What is critical is for investors to feel that the changes will take place
and that the system is not going to betray them by introducing policy changes
that will hurt them. Mutual trust is the critical step here. Actual implementation of
changes is an extra bonus but not a precondition for investment to respond. 
Phase Four, labelled ‘the tipping point’, is when investment actually starts
responding. The response here is not a simple increase in investment but rather a
significant increase that marks the beginning of a new trend where investment is
taken to much higher levels. Only as such would it qualify as the tipping point. It is
initiated by new investments made by leaders and then followed by others in the
sector. 
Phases Five and Six are periods over which the knock-on effect of Phase Four
can be observed. In Phase Five local investment in the sector concerned pulls in
FDI (foreign direct investment). In Phase Six, the confidence to invest spreads to
other sectors. Some of the policy changes induced by CIPI in one sector also
benefit other sectors. The investment in one sector induces investment in others.
A new stage is reached, in which the atmosphere of more trust in policymakers is
contagious and encourages others to invest. 
Phase Seven is the period beyond the peak of CIPI or beyond the completion of
its first round. Here we can distinguish between two very different paths. Path A is
the path where CIPI is maintained at a high level and Path B is the one where a
collapse in CIPI is experienced. In scenario A, collaboration and mutual support
between the key investors and policymakers is maintained. Both parties feel that
their objectives have been realised and feel that there is potential for more. The
policymaker is becoming more powerful and the investors are reaping the profits
of their increased investments. The relationships between the two sides become
more formal, taking on projects and developing policies beyond the initial sector
reforms. The example triggers replication in other sectors. It encourages investors
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from other sectors to establish CIPI with policymakers. In scenario B, the actions
of the policymaker are interpreted as undeserved favouritism to the sector in
question. It gives rise to criticism by other government officials, business
associations and, most important, the media. This jeopardises the political career
of the policymaker. For this or other reasons, there ceases to be a common
interest between policymakers and investors. CIPI collapses. The key empirical
question is whether investment also goes down. It could be that once the tipping
point is reached, investment is less dependent on the relationship with specific
policymakers. In other words, CIPI is particularly important at the earlier stage of
triggering the initial increase in investment. This transitional feature of CIPI has its
advantage: the relationship between investors and policymakers is less likely to
be abused.
The purpose of presenting these seven phases is not to prescribe what
policymakers and investors should do. On the contrary, it is meant as a framework
for understanding what actually goes on in the real world. Central to such
understanding is that due consideration is given to processes and phases. For
example, the framework invites us to examine whether and how a transition from
informal to formal relationships has occurred – or to look out for a tipping point at
which the investment kicks in. 
The empirical research will need to identify the contingent factors that influence
whether the process evolves as set out or differently. For example, the
organisational capacity of the private sector can be such a contingent factor.
Presumably an alignment of interests is difficult to construct with a disorganised
private sector. Then there are contingent factors arising from the nature of the
sector − new versus old sectors, lumpy versus continuous investments, etc. These
and other factors influencing the dynamics will emerge in the course of the
empirical research. 
4 Hypotheses and methodology
The contextual Section 2 stressed that, over the last ten years, investment varied
substantially over time and between sectors. These inter-sectoral and inter-
temporal variations have opened up the space for new research. This section
shows how we have used this space and specified the design of the project:
choice of sectors, hypotheses and data collection. 
4.1  Choice of sectors
The choice of sectors was influenced by the overall questions of how state-
business relationships evolved and how such relationships influenced investment.
We had a sense that relationships in old sectors had different roots and evolved
differently from those in new sectors. This was the reason for choosing two old
sectors, food and furniture, and two new sectors, communication and information
technology. When using the term ‘old’ we do not imply outdated but mean having
a long history.
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In order to deepen the insights we opted to compare a successful with a less
successful old sector and a successful with a less successful new sector. In the
early stage of the research we compiled and analysed secondary data on
investment which suggested that contrasting the food and furniture industries
would be useful (see Figure 2.3). Similar differences in investment were also
observed between communication and information technology, favouring their
analysis as separate sectors even though there were institutional reasons at the
outset for analysing them together. We should, finally, add that the choice of
sectors was also influenced by pragmatic considerations: we knew from our
previous work that there were good prospects of getting access to the key players
in industry and government in these sectors. 
The inter-sectoral (and inter-temporal) contrasts are critical to gaining insights
from the Egyptian experience, but this research report does not amount to a fully-
fledged comparison of four sectors. Much of it consists of selective contrasts in
order to bring out the (ir)relevance of particular factors. In the course of the
research we found that, on some issues, we had to further disaggregate by sub-
sector and region to unravel causal relationships.
4.2  Hypotheses
The hypotheses can be divided into two groups: one concerned with the creation
of CIPI, and one concerned with the impact of CIPI on investment. Their
specification can be derived from the conceptual framework presented earlier and
will be explained further when we present the findings.
A. Hypotheses relevant to the creation of CIPI
A.1 State-business relationships become effective only when there is a common 
interest in a sector’s growth and common understanding of its problems. 
A.2 Common interest between policymakers and key investors (CIPI) has its 
roots in a previous informal relationship at the educational, social or 
business levels (separately or combined).
A.3 CIPI creation is a short-term process and is fuelled by changes in 
government figures.
A.4 Initial interactions between key policymakers and investors are informal 
and then become institutionalised as the alignment of interests becomes 
clearer.
B. Hypotheses relevant to the impact of CIPI on investment 
B.1 CIPI plays its role through providing proxy governance benefits to specific
sectors or subsectors. 
B.2 CIPI plays a critical role in the success or failure of attracting investment 
to specific sectors and/or subsectors.
B.3 CIPI’s proxy governance benefits influence investors’ decisions to invest 
more than the general enabling environment does.
25
B.4 CIPI has an inclusive positive impact on the sector only where the private
sector has high organisational capacity. 
B.5 CIPI-induced investment reaches a tipping point which is a specific point 
in time when investment starts responding in a significant way (taking 
off).
B.6 The tipping point is followed by a knock-on effect, whereby local 
investment in the sectors concerned attracts FDI and stimulates 
investments in other sectors.
B.7 Disturbance of CIPI through conflict of interest between private investors 
and government will not affect investment if it has already taken off. 
4.3  Operationalising the key variables 
One of the greatest challenges in researching the above hypotheses is to
measure the key variable CIPI and its impact on investment. Four problems
arise. (1) Public-private interactions, whether occurring at a specific point in time
or observed over time, are difficult to capture because information is not readily
available and often confidential. This makes CIPI, the advanced stage of such
interactions, an unconventional and elusive variable that is difficult to measure. 
(2) CIPI carries from the outset the suspicion of possible corruptive behaviour
thus making policymakers and investors alike unwilling to explicitly discuss it. 
(3) Assuming that CIPI does have an impact on investment, it is difficult to
isolate its contribution from all other factors of relevance. (4) There are no clear
criteria for identifying the ‘tipping point’ or the point of big increases in
investment that mark the take-off of the sector (of key interest to policymakers)
and differentiating between this point and other increases in investments
previously observed.
In this project we try to deal with these four problems in the following way: 
 While investment is measured in quantitative ways, the relationships between
policymakers and investors are assessed with qualitative data collected 
through detailed interviews that do not have a fixed format but rather vary 
between direct and indirect questions as per the nature of interviewees (the 
sources of information and nature of interviews are explained in the next 
subsection). 
 The construction of CIPI is assessed through a descriptive analysis of the 
extent and type of the relations between policymakers and private investors, 
including common social, educational and business backgrounds, NGO 
affiliation, etc. that existed before policymakers took office.
 Reaching CIPI is assessed in terms of constructive and actionable proposals 
made by business people, the speed of response by policymakers in 
addressing the issues of concern to investors, the tangible policy changes 
and actions, and the level of formalisation of public-private interactions 
through the establishment of formal committees and fora that discuss private 
sector concerns.
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 61
26
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 61
27
 As for identifying the impact of CIPI, this is assessed through its contribution 
to creating ‘proxy governance’ in favour of the sector/s or investors in 
question, through various policies and actions. A list of perceived actions for 
empirical monitoring consists of:8
– Protection of specific property rights9
– Specific policy changes of technical relevance to the sector
– Reduction of transaction costs and uncertainties in relation to transaction 
costs 
– Reduction of public duties
– Provision of support services and infrastructure
– Adoption of a clear long-term vision for a particular sector. 
 The tipping point is to be empirically identified by four complementary methods:
(a) comparison of new investment levels at the potential tipping point to a 
previous trend of investment and clear recognition of unprecedented increases 
in investment; (b) supportive evidence for continuing interest in the sector in 
the specific tipping point year − such as sharp increases in exports or overall 
demand for products; (c) perceptions and speculations of investors and 
policymakers about the potential of the sector and its attractiveness to investors
detected in interviews; and (d) the extent to which the value chain of the 
concerned sector has been completed making it possible for the sector to 
‘take off’. 
4.4  Sources of information 
The research relies on a combination of quantitative and qualitative data. The
quantitative information comes from official sources such as GAFI (General Authority
for Investment), GOEIC (General Organization for Export and Import Control) and
the MCIT (Ministry of Communications and Information Technology), and quasi-
official sources such as the FEC (Food Export Council), FUEC (Furniture Export
Council), IMC (Industrial Modernization Center) and various business associations
and industrial chambers within FEI (the Federation of Egyptian Industries). 
The qualitative information is particularly critical for understanding the state-
business relations and comes from a total of 61 interviews. Table 4.1 shows how
these interviews were distributed between government and business and between
the old and new sectors. The category ‘business leaders’ consists mainly of
investors but also includes a small number of heads of business associations
/industrial chambers – most of whom were leaders of both enterprises and
associations/chambers. In addition to the interviews, we made short enquiries and
held conversations with numerous people on specific aspects so as to fill gaps in
our understanding; for example we spoke with 20 exhibitors at an IT trade fair
about their participation in business associations and chambers and their
experience in dealing with specific government agencies. 
8 These are just examples for empirical testing but do not exhaust the whole potential list.
9 To a small group as opposed to general protection of property rights through law.
Table 4.1 Interviews in old and new sectors
Actors Old Sectors New Sectors Total
Policymakers 10 8 18
Business leaders 22 21 43
Total 32 29 61
In research on relationships it is important to hear both sides. This principle
guided our empirical research but it needs to be mentioned that some
respondents worked on both sides – at different times! These were business
leaders who had been asked to set up or run government agencies. Not
surprisingly, these interviews proved most useful. More generally, some interviews
were more important than others. Particularly critical were the interviews with the
top decision-makers in government and in business. Obtaining access to them
was in some cases difficult, requiring a good deal of time-consuming networking
and negotiation. 
Interviews were conducted in both formal and informal settings. Confidentiality
was promised to the respondents. We used neither tape recorders nor research
assistants for these interviews so that respondents would feel at ease and talk
openly. In most cases this seemed to work but it is of course impossible to know
what information our respondents held back. Whenever possible, triangulation
was conducted across interviews; and information obtained in interviews was
cross-checked with other sources, including legal documents and published and
unpublished reports. 
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Part II Findings from old sectors
The presentation of findings is organised into three blocks: findings from the old
sectors, findings from the new sectors and lessons from the comparison −
commonalities and differences. 
5 Sectoral context: food and furniture
The reasons for including these two sectors were given earlier. The purpose of
this section is to contextualise the empirical findings presented later. This is done
on the basis of information collected in the course of the interviews and various
studies and reports (IMC 2003; IMC 2005; IMC 2006; Wood Chamber 2005).
5.1  The food sector
The food sector consists of around 5500 enterprises with 2000 formal and the rest
informal. The industry is divided into six main sub-divisions by product group: 
(1) processed fruits and vegetables; (2) dairy products; (3) bakery and confectionery;
(4) meat, chicken and fish processing; (5) all types of oil; and (6) tea, coffee and
tobacco. Seventy per cent of food industries fall into the small enterprise categories.
The largest enterprises within each sub-division operate within an oligopolistic
market setting. Key players use state of the art technology of production. The last
few years have seen a significant improvement in export performance in terms of
values and rates of increase, a process led by 70 enterprises. 
Most of the inputs of the sector are locally available. An improvement in integration
with agriculture in the last few years has been observed. The value chain has been
strengthened with new internationally reputable retail chains recently opening in
Cairo and Alexandria to provide outlets for food producers. A technology centre
specialising in food industries has also been activated. One of the big assets of
the food industries business community is its high organisational capacity. 
The main challenges facing the sector are: 
 The regulatory system is not unified. Several conflicting laws influence the 
sector, which increases transaction costs. 
 Industrial control over the sector involves agriculture, health and local supply 
authorities. All government organisations related to these can visit factories 
under the guise of industrial control. 
 Technical specification and standardisation is low and this contributes to 
waste of production inputs.10
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10 For example, waste of tomatoes in the production of tomato paste reaches up to 60 per cent because 
the crop does not meet specification for industrial production.
 The informal sector is big and produces low-quality products that compete 
with the formal industry in the local market through selling products that often 
do not meet health standards. 
 Reclaimed land has become very expensive.
5.2  The furniture sector
The furniture sector includes a core of 15 large enterprises, specialising in
western-style furniture, and many thousands of small enterprises, most of which
produce traditional furniture or parts thereof. Damietta is the region with the
highest concentration of enterprises (most of them tiny) and is specialised in
hand-crafted classic furniture. In terms of organisation and technology, the sector
is very heterogeneous. 
As for the value chain, all raw materials for the industry are imported. Local
production of accessories is limited and not developed and thus poses an
obstacle to expansion of the sector and large-scale production. The sector lacks
standardisation in production (measurement of doors and windows and kitchen
cabinets, etc.), which slows down the growth of the industry.
The main challenges facing the sector are: 
 Intense competition and friction between enterprises reduce the chance of 
integration within the sector.
 Imported wood is not of high quality and a technology centre has not yet been
established. 
 The typical small workshop structure of the industry is seriously delaying its 
progress. 
 Standardisation of measurements (for instance for doors, windows, chairs) is 
not yet achieved – except in Damietta). 
 Exporting firms face serious competition from East Asia. 
6 Emergence of  CIPI in old sectors
The hypotheses presented earlier drive the presentation of findings which are
organised in two groups: emergence of CIPI (Section 6) and effects of CIPI
(Section 7). The latter shows to what extent and in what circumstances CIPI
matters. This section shows how it emerged. Was it informally and accidentally?
Consciously constructed? Did it take a long time? What were the key stages?
Who were the key players? Throughout Sections 6 and 7, we proceed by recalling
the hypotheses and then presenting the findings.
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Hypothesis A.1: State-business relationships become effective only
when there is a common interest in a sector’s growth and common
understanding of its problems.
Empirical investigation revealed many incidences of public-private interactions − in
all four sectors and others11 − going on sometimes for years with no real positive
impact on the sector. Policymakers and investors were speaking different languages,
and did not see common ground or have any interest in listening to the other side. 
In the course of the interviews it became clear that mutual interest in and common
understanding of the problems to be solved were a necessary (but not sufficient)
condition for effective interactions. When mutual interest becomes clear, serious
efforts start to be made on both sides. Key investors in specific sectors make
promises to invest and increase exports and employ people, and policymakers
see the promise of receiving some credit for the potential advances. This not only
gives them personal glory but also improves their chances of remaining in office
or being promoted. Evidence and specific examples of advantages gained through
CIPI are presented later.
Empirical analysis revealed that the willingness of the policymakers to take action
in favour of a certain sector seems to be conditional upon, and proportional to,
the potential of the sector itself and the extent to which it can achieve visible and
tangible results in terms of increased investment, exports and job creation that
would give the policymakers credit. In fact it was stated by one highly prominent
policymaker, on a confidential basis, that even though the support of the Ministry
of Trade and Industry is offered across the board to all manufacturing industries,
it concentrates on a number of specific sectors or subsectors because they have
higher potential. This means that CIPI is reached faster for sectors with higher
potential. Food industries, for example, received much more attention from
policymakers than the furniture sector because the former is a bigger contributor
to industrial output, employment and exports – and, most importantly, has more
growth potential. 
Differing levels of government interest are observed not only between sectors
but also within sectors. For example, according to interviews, the processed
fruits and vegetables subsector receives more interest than meat processing.
The main reason seems to be meat processing’s present limited scale of
production and export. This point was emphasised by the investor interviewed
from this specific subsector. His exact words were ‘the Minister of Trade and
Industry does not have time to deal with our problems, we are still too small a
subset of food industries especially in comparison to processed fruits and
vegetables, and so cannot be on his priority list at the present time’. This implies
that CIPI is weaker in the meat processing subsector. In spite of the complexity
of the investment decision one can conclude that this lower level of CIPI in meat
processing explains, at least partially, why this food industry subsector has
received less interest from investors than processed fruits and vegetables, even
though it is not less profitable in the conventional economic sense. While such
subsectoral issues need to be recognised, the food sector as a whole was of
interest to policymakers because it combined economic viability and political
importance. 
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11 Such as the garment, auto components, auto, and marble and granite industries.
The interviews suggest, however, that mutual interest of policymakers and
investors in the sector is not sufficient in itself; it has to be combined with common
understanding of the problems that need to be solved. In the case of the food
sector, the common understanding of problems and potential solutions was greatly
facilitated by the fact that several new policymakers (starting in 2004) came from
the private sector and the Minister of Trade and Industry himself was, until he
became Minister, a prominent businessman in the food industry. 
By comparison, the furniture sector as a whole was not a promising sector for
constructing common interest. It did not have sufficient growth, export and
employment potential to be of major interest to policymakers. Interviews with
policymakers revealed the sector to be perceived by government officials as one
of ‘limited potential at least in the short run’. There were two interesting
exceptions. First, a few individual exporting companies were able to construct
close relationships with policymakers due to the owners’ prominent positions in
semi-public organisation which – as will be shown later – generated exclusive
rather than inclusive benefits. 
The second exception was the Damietta furniture cluster which benefited greatly
from a growth alliance based on common understanding and mutual interest
between local investors and policymakers. Damietta had an international reputation
and high profit potential in classic labour-intensive furniture production. However, it
required new investment in skills, equipment, organisational arrangements and
marketing to be able to position itself in the international market for such specific
products and bring tangible increases in exports and employment, not to mention
an improved image of Egypt. The perception of individual gain from collective
endeavour led to significant joint action in 2003−04. The parties involved were a
group of keen investors, the governor of Damietta, the old Minister of Industry and
the Industrial Modernization Center (IMC). Each one of these had their own interest
in making Damietta a success story. The investors saw high profit potential in their
industry that would be further enhanced if the industry received technical and
marketing support. The governor was new at the time and saw enormous political
mileage in helping local enterprises to establish an association and push his region
to excel in exports and investments. The old Minister of Industry, with limited
achievement until then, saw in Damietta an opportunity to associate his name with
a success story. Finally, IMC, a new institution with few achievements at the time,
and suffering from lots of criticism regarding its relevance to Egyptian industry,
saw the potential for a success story in industrial promotion. The frequency of
interaction helped to create a common understanding of the problems and
agreement on priorities for action. So a local form of CIPI emerged, attracting
international attention from analysts and practitioners in cluster development.  
In conclusion, the interviews brought home that all sectors have interactions
between government and business but often these remain inconsequential. We
hypothesised that common interest in a sector’s growth and common understanding
of the sector’s problems are essential for more effective relationships. The
interviews showed that such common interest and understanding is more
pronounced in the food sector than in the furniture sector (except for the Damietta
furniture cluster). The effect this has on public policy for these sectors and on
investment will become clearer when subsequent hypotheses are examined.
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Empirical evidence from the food sector
By informal linkages we mean the relationships between the policymakers and
members of the business community before the policymakers came to office. They
range from personal relations − such as attending the same school, being family
members etc. − to professional relations −such as working in the same field, or
having been business associates, or affiliated to similar political parties and/or
NGOs. Figure 6.1 shows the kind of informal linkages found between key
policymakers and important investors in the food industry. 
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Figure 6.1 Informal linkages between members from the business
community and government members specific to food industries
Hypothesis A.2: Common interest between policymakers and key
investors (CIPI) has its roots in a previous informal relationship at the
educational, social or business levels (separately or combined).
Four such linkages were investigated in some detail. Two key government officials
admitted frankly, but confidentially, that informal relations existed before the
current CIPI. Most respondents, however, regarded this as an awkward subject,
so finding evidence of previous informal relationships was not straightforward.
Only one of the key investors openly admitted that such informal relations have
had an impact on government interest in food industries (the full value chain). The
others firmly denied that these connections from the past had any relevance.
However, their responses to other questions concerning their relationships with
policymakers revealed the importance of those informal relations at least in having
access to the policymakers for problem-solving. To be clear, the point made here
is not that such informal relationships are illegitimate. The objective is purely
analytical: knowing the existence of such relationships helps to understand CIPI
and potentially also investment decisions. 
Empirical evidence from the furniture sector
Interviews revealed that, in the case of furniture, there were no previous informal
linkages between policymakers and investors. However, new links have been
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established between The Minister of Trade and Industry and two key investors in
the industry. One is currently the head of the Furniture Export Council12 while the
other is the director of the Industrial Modernization Center (IMC).13 According to
formal and informal interviews, the links between policymakers and these private
players were due to the leadership positions held by the private players in semi-
public institutions and their ability to articulate a vision for their own subsector.
Similarly, in the case of the furniture cluster of Damietta, there were no previous
informal relationships, yet a strong local CIPI was established in the period
2002−04. 
Informal relations amongst policymakers 
Empirical investigation revealed that the present structure of the Egyptian Cabinet
has deeply-rooted informal relations at its core. Members from the business
community have taken ministerial positions in the Egyptian government in 2004 for
the first time since 1952. These include the Ministers of Finance, Investment, Trade
and Industry, and Agriculture. They already knew each other from before at the
general business level and through common affiliation to different bodies −
membership of the HSBC board (one of the largest banks operating in Egypt), the
American Chamber of Commerce and the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies
(ECES). These links are relatively easy to demonstrate, other connections are
less visible. The above-mentioned Cabinet members chose to appoint other
members from the business community to public and semi-public positions – as
shown in Figure 6.2. In most cases these appointees were friends and
acquaintances. For example, the Minister of Trade and Industry and the Chairman
of the Federation of Egyptian Industries (FEI) are old friends at the individual and
family levels, both born in the same city (Alexandria). Similarly, the Minister of
Investment and the Head of the General Authority for Investment (GAFI) are close
friends and old business partners. Other Cabinet members know each other from
their previous university work. The Prime Minister and the Ministers for
Communication and for Administrative Development were all professors in the
Faculty of Engineering of Cairo University and worked together on a previous
project. So there is a group of Cabinet members and appointees with a strong
common background at the social and professional levels.
In conclusion, the hypothesis is only partially confirmed. CIPI has its roots in
informal relationships in the food sector, but not in the furniture sector. However,
there are strong informal relations between key policymakers. These informal
linkages between key people in government facilitate speedy implementation of
policies and have a bearing on relationships with the business community. The
latter point is worth elaborating on even though it goes beyond the hypothesis
examined here. 
12 Export Councils are semi-government organisations under the authority of the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry with membership from the business community. The role of councils is further analysed below.
13 IMC is an independent institution founded on the basis of an EU fund but currently operating under the
authority of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The centre specialises in providing technical support to 
enterprises and has substantial funds for this purpose.
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The environment of trust and policymakers’ ability to take action
It has been confirmed through all the interviews that the mere existence of
businessmen in the Cabinet, irrespective of their sectoral affiliation, has created a
bridge between the two sides. Leaving sectoral specificities aside, policymakers now
speak the same language as their former colleagues in the private sector and thus
understand their problems. This has helped to build trust between the two sides
and generated willingness to take action. The willingness has translated into ability
to take action because there is network of policymakers that allows quick decision-
making, including changes in policies. The network is referred to in Figure 6.3 as
the investment circle, the network of quick decision-making. The benefits of the
circle lie in quick response of the whole group to the request of one policymaker. 
As already argued in Section 2, this resulted in both a change in the perception of
the business community by the government from controlling with distrust to
promoting with good will. It also resulted in quicker and more coordinated public
action, if pushed by any of the members of the group of policymakers. For
example, the Minister of Finance has made rapid and unorthodox changes in
customs policy in response to requests by the Minister of Trade and Industry. The
interviews with business people revealed several other such incidences of
coordinated government action. 
Figure 6.2 Cabinet community members appointing other members from
the business community in key public and semi public institutions
Source: Interviews and secondary sources.
This, however, does not mean that there are no problems. Different players can
have different priorities so friction can still emerge, as detected from the
interviews. For example, many constraints of relevance to food industries are still
pending because they have their roots in agriculture and the Minister of
Agriculture is not adopting the required corrective policies. A case in point is the
issue of scarcity of reclaimed land. Despite the existence of CIPI in the food
sector, agricultural policy changes have been slow because senior officials in the
Ministry have a different understanding of the sectoral problems. They see the
reclaimed land from an agricultural angle (combining delta and desert land in one
package, attempting to minimise the institutional differences between them). And
they tend to underestimate the benefits of reclaimed land to food processing. So
the common understanding of problems referred to earlier is also necessary within
government. All this leads to a conclusion which may seem obvious but was not
captured in our original hypotheses: the effectiveness of sectoral CIPI is
enhanced if it (the relationship based on common interest, understanding and
trust) extends into the ‘engine room’ of economic policymaking. 
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Hypothesis A.3: CIPI creation is a short-term process and is fuelled by
changes in government figures.
Figure 6.3 The Investment Circle – the network of quick decision-making
As shown above, the inclusion of business people in the 2004 Cabinet marked a
watershed in state-business relations. It appeared to be a sudden change, taking
most observers by surprise. This gives the impression that creating CIPI can be a
quick process brought about by the state. This conclusion would, however, be
misleading. 
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From the late 1980s when the private sector started to play a tangible role in the
Egyptian economy, haphazard attempts to narrow the gap between the
government on one side and the business community on the other were initiated
by individuals on each side, at some level or other. It started off with individual
private sector members trying to get closer to the government and lobbying for
government support to the private sector. The individuals became well known in
Egypt and probably derived some personal benefit but there was no impact on
investment or any other aspect of their industries. 
In the early nineties, some specialised associations were created to support the
case of the private sector. Some were product-specific, such as the ‘Clothing
Exporters Association’ which was created in 1993 to seek changes in policy that
would enhance the exports of ready-made garments. Others were of a more
general nature. The most important of these organisations, however, is the
Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, whose members consist of the most
prominent members of the business community (some of whom are currently in
high positions in government, including the Cabinet). It was established in 1992,
specifically to study the issues of concern for private investors, suggest general
and sector-specific policy changes and make these suggestions reach the top
levels of government circles. The slogan of ECES was ‘private initiative for public
action’. The role of the centre became stronger over the years as some of its
members started to take public positions and the political affiliation of its members
became directly linked to the ruling party.
What is agreed upon by our interviewees, and stressed in particular by a
prominent member of the Clothing Association, is that during the early days in
these organisations, there were private investors on one side and bureaucrats in
the government on the other side with very weak bridges between them. The two
sides were speaking different languages. Then the government started to hear but
did not listen. It took a long time for common understanding of problems to be
reached and thus willingness to act to take place. It was a long process.
Efforts for bridging the gap between the private sector and the government were
not only initiated from the private sector side but also from some government
officers who saw the future benefit of such collaboration, even if it showed little
promise of success at the time. An example of such attempts is the
establishment of the Commodity Councils back in the early 1990s by the Minister
of Internal Trade at the time. The Councils were quasi-public bodies with no
decision-making authority. They were a formal set-up designed to allow
representatives of private and public producers to discuss the problems affecting
their sectors and bring these to the attention of the authorities. The Councils,
however, proved to be ineffective as producers were only interested in their
individual problems with no sectoral or strategic dimension of any kind. It was not
until their transformation into Export Councils under the present Minister of Trade
and Industry that they became a more effective consultation mechanism.
The important conclusion at this stage is that creating CIPI is not an overnight
process. It takes time. The process is initiated at some level or other when the
private sector starts to engage with the government but it could take years to
develop and become effective, depending on the country and even the sector.
According to all interviewees, 2004 marked a turning point for Egypt. While most
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analysts see a change across the board, later sections of this paper show
considerable sectoral differences in terms of public-private relationships,
organisational capacity and investment.
Hypothesis A.4: Initial interactions between the key policymakers and
investors are informal and then become institutionalised as the alignment
of interests becomes clearer. 
Speaking a common language and translating private sector requests into a
language that the government can understand and accommodate is a big
challenge for both sides. CIPI is at the heart of this translation process. What
follows are two examples in which this was achieved through a negotiation
process which started informally and was later institutionalised. 
Example 1: Reclaimed land allocation to big investors
Reclaimed desert land is in high demand by big agricultural exporters and agro-
industrialists in Egypt because, unlike delta land, it is virgin land that satisfies the
conditions of traceability required by the EU. It also proved to be suitable for the
cultivation of a huge variety of fruits and vegetables.
The government originally adopted a system of land ownership − similar to the
existing delta system – limiting individual land ownership to a maximum of 300
feddans.14 Individual investors bought the land and started using it for export
purposes. The success of desert plantations led to a call for allocating more land to
these people to facilitate economies of scale and guarantee supply to customers. 
This need could not be satisfied for three reasons:
 The aforementioned limitation on individual land ownership. 
 Land prices went sky high because of overall limited supply and government 
insistence that buying the land was the only option for land accessibility. 
 The fact that more than 70 per cent of the reclaimed land was divided into 
plots of 3−5 feddans and sold at give-away prices to fresh university 
graduates from various disciplines. It was meant to be a push by the 
government to reduce unemployment and it was given a lot of political weight.
The private sector sought to change this policy in several ways: 
 Removal of restrictions on individual land ownership. 
 Provision of other routes to land acquisition beyond purchase, such as long-
term leasing and other means adopted in other countries.
 Reaching a legal arrangement whereby investors are allowed to cultivate the 
huge areas of reclaimed desert land owned by graduates. This last point was 
14 In the case of delta land it is 50 feddans (one feddan is 4,200 square metres).
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particularly crucial because the young graduates proved to be unsuccessful in
planting the desert exactly because this requires considerable expertise and 
capital investments. Big investors could afford these but graduates could not. 
From an economic point of view, there was a strong case for finding a solution
that would provide big investors with access to this land. From a political point of
view it was very sensitive because it involved granting rights to the rich and taking
them away from the poor. The challenge was to find a solution that would be
economically viable, politically acceptable and benefit all sides.
The solution found was to transform the basis of graduate land ownership into
shares in a joint stock company so that the land would be planted by the big
investors and provide returns to graduates on their stocks. This agreement was
reached through informal negotiations behind closed doors between relevant
investors and policymakers. Furthermore, a new agricultural modernisation council
was created with membership drawn from big investors in agriculture and fruit and
vegetables processing and the Minister of Agriculture. The intention was mainly to
introduce even more changes in the same area such as removal of all restrictions
on individual land ownership. Announcement of the new system took place only
after informal – and secret – negotiations had taken place and all alternatives
were analysed. This policy change was long overdue and would not have seen
the light without CIPI.
Example 2: Cancellation of energy subsidy
Energy has always been subsidised in Egypt at the consumer level as well as the
industrial level. This subsidy has enabled Egypt to attract investment – local as
well as foreign – to sectors that are energy-intensive but created a skewed and
unhealthy investment pattern. In addition, it caused a huge burden on the
government, in particular at times of high international energy prices. 
For years, calls have been made for cancellation of the subsidy in a gradual way
so as to reach economic energy prices but it has always been opposed by
industrialists on the grounds that such a move will destroy their competitive
advantage and cause a loss of jobs because enterprises will close down. The
topic has been politically very sensitive.
The close informal relations between the Minister of Trade and Industry and the
Chairman of the Federation of Industry facilitated the bold move by the Minister to
cancel the subsidy. Informal negotiations behind closed doors with key players in
the industry within FEI under the supportive umbrella of the Chairman – who is an
industrialist belonging to the textile and ready-made garment sector – built support
for the call to cancel the subsidy, despite its immediate negative impact on
industrialists generally. Involving the industrialists in the negotiations and discussing
the issue with them before announcing the cancellation has had an extremely
positive impact as hardly any resistance emerged when the actual Ministerial decree
was announced. In fact, FEI’s Chairman publicly announced FEI’s full support for
the Minister’s decision immediately after its public declaration. All businessmen
interviewed stated that the fact that the issue was discussed with them before
announcement and via members from their own community made all the difference.
It is interesting to note finally that the food industries and textiles and clothing
industries have been exempted from removal of the subsidy, which is supposed to
take place over three years. CIPI is strong in these two sectors. The business
benefit is obvious. And the Minister was interested for political reasons – the two
sectors are major employers.
7 The impact of  CIPI in old sectors
Section 6 examined the hypotheses concerned with the emergence/creation of
CIPI. This section examines the hypotheses concerned with the impact of CIPI. The
impact of central interest is of course that on investment – and correspondingly
several hypotheses are concerned with this ‘ultimate’ impact. We start, however,
examining the more immediate impact of CIPI, asking whether it improved the
provisions made by the state for the sector(s) in question. More specifically, we
ask whether changes in what we call ‘proxy governance’ have been made. These
include, for example: protection of specific property rights; specific policy changes
of technical relevance to the sector; reduction of uncertainties in transaction costs;
reduction of public duties; provision of support services and infrastructure;
adoption of a clear long-term vision for a particular sector. 
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Hypothesis B.1: CIPI plays its role through providing proxy governance
benefits to specific sectors or subsectors. 
From 2004 onwards, there was a general improvement in the business
environment in Egypt, observable in, for instance, the new tax law, reduction of
customs duties, and other policy changes (see Table A2 in the Appendix). All
interviewees from the food and furniture sectors – as well as respondents from
other sectors – agreed that this improvement was because the business
community and policymakers were finally speaking the same language and
sharing a common understanding of the obstacles. They understood the need for
urgent policy changes for all manufacturing industries. As stressed earlier, the
good relationships between certain key policymakers made it possible to act fast.
There was not only the willingness but also the ability to take swift action. 
These horizontal measures have attracted international attention and are reflected
in Egypt’s improved ‘Doing Business’ indicators over the period 2006–08
(www.doingbusiness.org) but they were not prompted by the previous poor
position in the international Doing Business rankings (interviews). It is less well
known that there were a number of selective interventions focused on specific
sectors. They are less well known partly because neither government nor
business people like to talk about them – because of the risk of accusations of
favouritism and corruption. Our concern was to establish whether these
interventions had their roots in CIPI.
The difficulty of researching this question became immediately apparent. Only two
key interviewees – one businessman and one policymaker – explicitly admitted
that many recent policy changes were geared towards specific sectors on the
grounds of CIPI. Despite the absence of consensus, however, the view of the two
interviewees is supported by other collected evidence through indirect questions
and more importantly through documented policy changes. While it needs to be
pieced together, there is strong evidence to confirm the hypothesis that CIPI
concentrates on some sectors more than others. 
Here we concentrate first on the food sector. Table A4 (Appendix) lists the policy
changes adopted during 2004–2007 that were specifically aimed to benefit the
food sector. The interviews with business leaders from the food sector and
policymakers revealed – directly and indirectly – that most of these policy changes
were due to the common interest between the two sides. The policymakers were
willing to grant these changes because they needed new private investment that
would help increase exports and, above all, employment in a labour-intensive
industry. And the investors recognised this. (We will see later whether investment
did increase.) Interviewees revealed that several new policies and initiatives were
triggered or facilitated by CIPI. These included: protection of specific property
rights such as land allocation to big investors; policies of a specific technical
nature such as giving priority to harmonisation of food standards for 2000 items;
having private sector members from the food business community on the board of
public institutions; and, the reduction of transaction costs for investors. 
In the case of the furniture industry, it was shown earlier that CIPI was weak for
the sector as a whole. Indeed, there is little proxy governance for this sector to
report. The exception however is again the furniture cluster of Damietta which –
as established earlier – had developed a strong form of local CIPI which lasted
from 2002 to 2004 (the reasons for the subsequent decline in that CIPI are
discussed later). During 2002–04, support for the cluster was stepped up
significantly.15 This support took various forms. According to investors from the
region interviewed, the Governor made himself readily available to help solve
problems faced by the entrepreneurs. IMC offered significant levels of technical
support to upgrade the skills of workers and prepare Damietta producers to
present their work at specialised international trade fairs (such as ‘Index’ in Dubai
and ‘Salon du Meuble’ in Paris). According to the Chairman of the producers’
association, effective support was provided by Expo Link (an institution
specialising in arranging participation in international fairs) to make sure Damietta
producers presented their work as per international standards and as one group
with a collective image.16 A new logo of ‘Made in Damietta’ was also developed.
This is an example of proxy governance of direct benefit to a specific subsector
that led to increased external demand for Damietta products, leading in turn to
increased investments to meet that demand. Proxy governance to that subsector
was taken back, however, under the new Cabinet and new IMC administration –
indicating the fragility of such proxy governance. 
In conclusion, the interviews and actual policy changes confirm that CIPI has led
to proxy governance benefits for the food sector. It was difficult, though, to get
investors to explicitly admit the role of CIPI in granting these sector-specific
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15 Under the leadership of the previous Minister of Industry and previous management of IMC.
16 Previously, individual Damietta exhibitors were scattered all around the fair, thus making no 
impression at all on visitors.
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benefits. However, indirect questions revealed the key role of CIPI. The interviews
also indicated that sector-specific CIPI contributed to changes across the board in
traditional elements of the business environment.
This part of the empirical investigation was quite demanding and sensitive. To say
that relationships with policymakers have a critical impact on attracting investment
seems to suggest corruption and impropriety so all interviewees inevitably denied
this was the case. The real situation could therefore only be inferred from what they
said, and needed to be cross-checked several times for validity. To unravel the chain
of causality, a detailed exploration into the reasons behind success or failure in
attracting investment had to be conducted at the level of each investor interviewed
in order to ascertain how significant proxy governance facilitated by CIPI had been. 
It became clear from the outset that all business interviewees from the food and
furniture sectors see ‘profit potential’ as the number one reason for investing.
Upon deeper investigation, however, profit potential is revealed as a complex
variable that includes more than just the conventional economic profit (total
revenue minus total cost of an enterprise or return on invested capital). It also
includes present and future uncertainties about public policy in relation to the
sector, such as the perceived importance of the sector to the government, or
availability of sector-specific infrastructure and support services, etc.
Nevertheless, all the respondents confirmed that, in the absence of a minimum of
‘conventional economic profit’, investors would not even consider investing. 
Elements of CIPI emerged in the interviews with food investors as soon as
questions were raised concerning the constraints facing investors. Each investor
was then asked about the actual role of CIPI. Only one investor explicitly stated
that he would not have expanded his investments if it were not for CIPI. All the
others denied that CIPI and proxy governance would ever be the sole reason
behind investment. However, they were then asked whether they would have
invested anyway even if favourable policies and bridges of trust with the
government had not been established. None answered with an explicit ‘no’. This
seems to point to the important role played by CIPI in unleashing the full profit
potential of the sector through unblocking the way forward and reducing the risks
faced by potential investors.
Interviewees’ answers to more specific questions on constraints to investment
supported this conclusion. CIPI is perceived by all interviewees to have reduced
uncertainties in the food sector in an unprecedented way and to have facilitated
solutions to chronic problems related to the sector. However, the strength and
effectiveness of CIPI varied by subsector, and processed fruits and vegetables
(preservation, freezing and dehydration) benefited most from the problem
resolution provided by CIPI, for reasons explained later. 
The strength of CIPI and its effectiveness varied greatly within the furniture
industry. The clearest positive evidence comes from the Damietta furniture cluster,
supporting the conclusion that CIPI plays an indispensable role in unblocking
problems that were holding the cluster back. Such problems can affect many
Hypothesis B.2: CIPI plays a critical role in the success or failure of
attracting investment to specific sectors or subsectors.
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elements that lie beyond the conventional economic profit but that still, to
investors, represent an indispensable part of the profit potential of the sector. 
All interviewed investors and policymakers confirmed that CIPI was essential for
boosting investments in Damietta in the period 2002–04. In the words of one of
the respondents, ‘between them, the Governor, IMC and the producers’ local
association solved most problems’. This helped local firms to respond to rising
export demand which was the main reason for the investment boom in the region.
Interestingly, investment continued after 2004 despite the decreasing relevance of
CIPI later on – an issue explored later. The key point to register here is that CIPI
was behind unleashing the profit potential beyond conventional economic profit,
and encouraged investment in the region. 
What then can we say in conclusion about the role of CIPI in accelerating private
investment? In the case of the food industry, Figure 2.3 (Section 2 above) shows
that investment since 2004 has oscillated but risen substantially (average annual
rate of growth in the period 2004–08 exceeded 60 per cent while reaching only 
7 per cent in the whole period from 1995–2003).17 We have shown here that it
would be wrong to attribute the causality of the investment rise to CIPI or to any
other individual factor, as the investment decision is quite complex and involves a
number of factors. What is confirmed here, however, is that in situations where
the profit potential is good but not realised, CIPI is essential for unblocking the
way forward in the short and medium term. The furniture industry as a whole did
not experience an increase in investment so the hypothesis cannot be examined
in the same way. We can however record that, at a broad sectoral level, there
was no CIPI – a feature examined in more detail later when we discuss the
organisational (in)capacity of the private sector. The key point to retain here is that
CIPI was strong in the case of the Damietta furniture cluster and had a substantial
positive impact on local private investment. 
Hypothesis B.3: CIPI’s proxy governance benefits influence investors’
decisions to invest more than the general enabling environment does.
17 Calculated on the basis of data reflected in Figure 2.3.
It can be inferred from almost all interviews with private investors that they do not
give much weight to the investment climate ‘at the macro level’, at least not in the
short and even medium term. While not necessarily made explicit this was a
common message. Investors are specifically interested in the business and
investment climate ‘at the micro level’, i.e. at the level of their business and its
future. They care about reducing the uncertainties related to their specific
investments and seek reassurance that they can reap future benefits from
investments made today. If this can be achieved without introducing any
improvements in the general investment climate then they will invest, provided
that the sector itself is promising. 
It is interesting to note that a similar observation is also made by foreign investors.
If the investors’ individual logistics problems are solved and they have a positive
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 61
44
vision of the (sub)sector, they are willing to invest even in the absence of a
general enabling environment. This was explicitly stated by the General Manager
of the multinational food company interviewed. According to him, the advance
announcement of energy prices to be paid by food processors in the next five
years was a key factor supporting the company’s investment decisions,
irrespective of the status of the investment climate at the macro level.
An additional supporting example, though showing discouragement of investment,
comes from the auto component sector. One of the key investors in that domain
said that foreign investors are discouraged from coming to Egypt because there is
still little transparency regarding future customs on cars, and this directly affects
the profitability of investment in the auto sector. The issue is not about
removing/reducing or increasing customs but rather about simply knowing what
they are likely to be. The issue is one of ‘reduction of uncertainty’, which lies at
the heart of an investment decision.18 The reduction of uncertainty here is very
specific to the auto sector and not to the economy as a whole, which further
confirms that foreign investors focus on what is of direct relevance to their specific
businesses when making investment decisions. 
In the food sector, CIPI has been a facilitator and a catalyst that improves the
conditions of the sector. Uncertainties are reduced and willingness to invest
increases. Investors see a way of benefiting from the potential of the sector in the
short and medium term. Practically speaking, in the eyes of the investors, CIPI
seems to obviate the need for a general enabling environment in the short and
medium term. More importantly, it creates a level of trust in and credibility for the
government – in relation to the specific sector – that might never be reached in a
developing country even if all the elements of a typical general enabling
environment were there on paper.
However, big national and foreign investors interviewed mentioned that such
short- and medium-term proxy governance benefits provided by CIPI would not be
enough in the long term. More elements of what is conventionally regarded as an
enabling environment are needed. These responses confirm the conventional
literature conclusion that an enabling environment is necessary for sustainable
development but they do not confirm it as an immediate policy priority.
Hypothesis B.4: CIPI has an inclusive positive impact on the sector only
where the private sector has high organisational capacity.
18 The importance of the uncertainty element in the investment climate definition has been emphasised 
in Moore and Schmitz (2008).
This hypothesis was tested through a close analysis of the organisational capacity
of the food and furniture sectors and assessment of the extent to which actions
triggered by big players through CIPI arrangements benefit the big players only,
extend to benefit the whole sector, or even go beyond to impacting other sectors 
as well. All interviews and collected evidence revealed that the benefit to the 
sector as a whole triggered by individual CIPI actions seems to be influenced by
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the organisational capacity of the sector. The more organised the sector as a
whole, the more CIPI benefits are likely to extend to the whole sector and not just
the small group involved in triggering the action.
As seen in Table A4 in the Appendix, the food sector has enjoyed a lot of positive
policy changes triggered by CIPI that also benefit the whole sector. In the case of
furniture, on the other hand, other than adding furniture to the export support
umbrella of the government and making the sector generally more visible, the sector
as a whole has benefited very little. The difference in the organisational capacity in
the two sectors seems to explain – at least partially – the different observed impact
of CIPI in the two sectors. Similar examples are also found in other sectors.19 Table
7.1 presents samples of different effects of ‘exclusive’ relationships in the food and
furniture industries.
Table 7.1 Exclusive relationships and their exclusive/inclusive effects 
Area of Specific action Benefit to Benefit to the
intervention specific groups whole sector
Food Industry
Protection of Yes Yes
specific 
property rights
Specific policy Yes Yes
changes
Furniture Industry
Reduction of Yes No
uncertainties
Source: Extracted from Table A4 in the Appendix
Complete change of the system
for reclaimed land allocation from
small slot allocation to fresh
graduates to large slots cultivated
by big investors and guaranteed
return and employment for fresh
graduates
Harmonisation of local standards
with international standards for
2000 food items 
Creation of an informal ad hoc
mechanism for solving big
company problems one by one
19 Specific examples of limited benefit of CIPI because of poor organisation of the sector are also 
witnessed in the ready-made garment sector and the cement industry.
Whether and how the public-private relationships has exclusive or inclusive effects is
thought to depend at least in part on how the private sector is organised. What follows
is a brief analysis of the organisational capacity of the food and furniture sectors. 
Organisational capacity of the food sector
A great asset of the food industry is its high level of organisation and leadership.
The sector is led by a small group of highly qualified investors with charismatic
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personalities and ability to think at the strategic level. The Food Chamber is the only
Chamber within the Federation of Egyptian Industries that has a qualified manager
and highly paid personnel. It is also the only Chamber that has given a vice
chairman position to a female and that has a multinational company on its board.
The Chamber is highly active and sets an example to all others. An important
feature of the Chamber is that it has almost 100 per cent membership of the
entire formal food sector. This makes the Chamber an inclusive organisation even
though informal enterprises (of which there are many) are not included. There is
also active participation of all food subsectors (through their representatives) in
the committee meetings of the Chamber, irrespective of their subsector affiliation
(dairy, meat processing etc.) – members are assigned specific roles in addressing
the issues of long-term interest for the sector as a whole. The same applies to the
Food Industries Export Council. All areas of interest to exporters are addressed
through sub-committees of members, and problems of individual exporters are
discussed by the Council and, when appropriate, raised with government
agencies.
These organisational features, the participatory spirit and the actual practices
have been confirmed through both interviews and personal observation. One of
the authors has attended several food Chamber and Council meetings and
observed both the formal proceedings of meetings and informal discussions; there
was no sign of explicit or implicit suspicion by members of ‘exclusive’
arrangements involving the sector leaders. Similarly, no respondents outside the
group of big investors have accused any Chamber or Council members or
business leaders of abuse of power or of following narrow self-interest at the
expense of the sector’s interests overall. 
The high level of organisational capacity and participatory practice does not
necessarily mean that all subsectors and enterprises will benefit equally and at
the same time. It does, however, mean that (1) issues of common interest to all,
such as a unified food law and one food authority, receive proper attention and
are pushed forward; and (2) all subsectors have the chance to voice their aims
and concerns and be heard. Of course, some voices are louder than others and
those representing the sector vis-à-vis the policymakers are influenced by their
own subsectoral experience. 
Organisational capacity of the furniture sector
The situation in the furniture sector is very different. The Furniture Chamber is
poorly organised and comprises less than 10 per cent of producers. Both the
Furniture Chamber and the Furniture Export Council are dominated by a group of
15 enterprises who have little concern for the rest of the sector. The leaders of this
group have close connections to the policymakers and have been able to obtain
benefits for themselves and the small group of enterprises that dominate the
Chamber and Council. These benefits include preferential treatment from
government bureaucracy and substantial funds to obtain several rounds of
technical support services for their factories. These funds came from the IMC – an
institution which is funded by the EU and the Ministry of Industry and Trade – at a
time when one of the leaders of the furniture industry was chairman of the IMC
(2004–07).
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Information on exclusive practices is hard to obtain but a clear picture emerged
from talking to several furniture manufacturers, an ‘excluded’ key player, two
policymakers, staff of the IMC and project officers of the EU interacting with the
Furniture Export Council. They confirm the exclusivity of the benefits to the small
group of big investors. The vast majority of the other producers are small and not
heard by policymakers. Benefits available in principle to all through the IMC and
other institutions are not even known to the small investors.
The Damietta group was amongst those businesses excluded from the
(supposedly national Chamber and Council), but this group had formed its own
local organisation in 2003; the ‘Association for Upgrading the Furniture Sector of
Damietta’ was set up to bring together and mobilise local enterprises and
represent their interests with all institutions. This association was important to the
revival of the region despite problems within the local business community and
the bias against it by the national leaders of the furniture sector. 
To conclude, empirical research in both the food and furniture sectors has
confirmed the validity of this hypothesis. While CIPI is by definition an exclusive
arrangement, its impact on the sector is not necessarily exclusive as well. It can be
inclusive where the organisational capacity of the sector is high. The food sector
supports this – particularly when compared with the furniture sector. However, the
comparison also highlights the need to specify whose organisational capacity is
being considered. In a way, the exclusive ‘club’ of big furniture-makers was highly
organised to pursue their own narrow aims – but it had little organisational
capacity to represent and promote the sector as a whole. Perhaps it is better to
examine two features that do not necessarily go together – organisational capacity
and legitimacy (which comes from being elected by a broad-based organisation).
Some sectors have neither, for example the Egyptian granite and marble industry.
Such organisational features of the private sector are of great importance to
policymakers in the public sector. Relationship-based governance is very difficult
when the private sector has no organisational capacity and legitimate leaders. 
Hypothesis B.5: CIPI-induced investment reaches a tipping point which
is a specific point in time when investment starts responding in a
significant way (taking off).
The hypothesis has two components: (1) there is a substantial increase in
investment – at a specific point in time, the ‘tipping point’; and, (2) this investment
tipping point is caused by CIPI. The first component was empirically tested in
relation to the food industries on the basis of unpublished (privileged) secondary
data from primary collection sources (the General Authority for Investment, the
Food Export Council, and the General Organization for Exports and Imports
Control), in addition to detailed analysis of (6-digit HS code)20 trade map export
data. The conclusions of the analysis have been further cross-checked in
interviews with investors in the food industries.
20 Export data is typically presented in product group codes referred to as HS codes. The more digits, 
the more specific the product is (for example a very specific type of cheese within the cheese group).
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Figure 7.1 shows the potential tipping point for the food industry.21 2004 is the
year when the changes started taking place. In the subsector of processed fruits
and vegetables (not shown separately), the change was particularly pronounced,
reflecting both its attraction as a subsector for investment, and its leadership of
food industries as a whole – more than 70 per cent of all food sector investment in
most recent years.
21 According to interviews, 2006 has been associated with mergers and acquisitions of enterprises that 
are not captured by basic statistics on investment from GAFI.
Figure 7.1 Annual real investment in food industries, 1995–2008* (in
million Egyptian pounds)
*Until the end of November 2008
Source: GAFI – Nominal investment data deflated by authors
In addition to the impressive positive change in investment trend observed in the
period (2004–08) – 43 per cent of all investments in the sector between 1970 and
2006 took place between 2004 and 2006 (Abdel-Latif 2007) – large increases in
food exports from 2004 to date have also been observed, as can be seen in
Figure 7.2. Some food enterprises interviewed stated that they increased their
investments by 300 and 400 per cent in order to meet increasing demands for
exports. More importantly, the food industries value chain has been strengthened
by a stronger retail chain, food standards conforming to international standards, a
national food authority and unified food law. In other words, the institutional
infrastructure is almost complete, indicating that the sector can take off on its own.
All the above supports the existence of a tipping point around 2004. However, it is
important to note that not enough time has elapsed to confirm a complete change
in trend. 
Is the upward trend in investment due to CIPI? Stating an immediate causal
connection would be foolish. The investment increase in 2004 is too close to the
Cabinet changes of 2004, in the wake of which CIPI emerged in the food industry.
As argued in the discussion of Hypothesis B2, CIPI cannot be considered a cause
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but it seems to have been a facilitator and catalyst. While interviews confirmed the
link between willingness to invest and CIPI, the tipping point itself in the case of
the food industries seems to have its roots in a previous year. In fact, it is likely
that the change started in 2003, triggered by increases in international demand
and Egypt’s increased food exports. Here, the driving force for the investment was
international demand, but the ability to respond to increases in demand over
several years and remove supply constraints was strengthened by CIPI. In this
sense, CIPI seems to have played a role. 
Perhaps it is useful to add a word of caution concerning the data on which the
analysis is based. According to GAFI (the source for the investment data), the
data capture the investments registered with GAFI only and do not include
investments registered at the governorate level. The figures are therefore an
underestimate and it is not clear whether the relative importance of the two
sources changes over time. This makes it difficult to be precise in the tipping point
analysis. 
In conclusion, no definite conclusion confirming or denying the tipping point
hypothesis can be reached on the basis of the available quantitative and qualitative
data. It is however clear that investment increased due to rising international
demand for food products and that CIPI helped to remove the supply constraints.
Hypothesis B.6: The tipping point is followed by a knock-on effect,
whereby local investment in the sectors concerned attracts FDI and
stimulates investments in other sectors.
Figure 7.2 Trend of Egyptian food industries exports, 2002–2008
Source: Calculated by authors on the basis of export data provided by the General Organization for Exports
and Imports Control (GOEIC) and the Food Export Council
The first component of the hypothesis was examined – for the food industry – on
the basis of interviewees’ statements and statistical analysis of the available
unpublished (privileged) data collected from primary sources.
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Interviews revealed that large Arab and other foreign investments in the form of
new investments and mergers and acquisitions have taken place in the food
industries from 2004 on. A multinational investor interviewed emphasised that
increased confidence of local investors actually triggered FDI. His exact words
were ‘no one would invest in a sector or country where private local investment is
not willing to go’. Of course, foreign investors make their own assessment and
stated that, in the food sector, Egypt has the following advantages compared with
other countries in the Middle East. 
 Despite initial investment advantages in other countries, their operational 
costs are high – for example in the case of Dubai (employment of expats) or 
Saudi Arabia (high cost of electricity). 
 Existing food processing in other Arab countries is not as developed as in 
Egypt.
 The land is good: the fertile Nile Delta plus the huge potential of reclaimed 
desert land.
 Only Egypt has the full value chain for a sustainable food processing industry 
– particularly traceability conditions and the backward linkages to agriculture.
Figure 7.3 shows the yearly investment in food industries in the period 1995–2008,22
disaggregated by Egyptian, Arab and foreign (non-Arab) investments. It only
captures the new investments and not the mergers and acquisitions, even if
involving enlargement of facilities.
Figure 7.3 Annual real investment in food industries, 1995–2008* (in
million Egyptian pounds)
* Until the end of November 2008
Source: GAFI – Nominal investment data deflated by authors
22 The detailed distribution for investment in processed fruits and vegetables could not be obtained by 
researchers.
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Four observations can be made: 
 the trend in Arab and Foreign investments is similar to that of Egyptian 
investment; 
 the years 2004 and 2005 show higher investments than all other years, 
indicating something special about those years; 
 the investment data do not include the mergers and acquisitions, which 
represent an important component of investments in the food industries, 
according to interviewees; 
 even if interviewees’ statements support the knock-on effects, the data do not 
allow a firm conclusion to be drawn on the sequence in which national and 
foreign investment occurred. In conclusion, examining the hypothesised knock-on
effect from national to foreign investments needs more complete investment 
data, a longer time-frame and more interviews with foreign and Arab investors. 
It is even more difficult to come to a conclusion on the sectoral knock-on effect
from the food to other sectors. The theoretical argument in the conceptual
framework suggests that a knock-on occurs because the bottlenecks removed by
CIPI in one sector would also help other sectors and thus stimulate investments in
these sectors. The empirical study could not reach a specific conclusion on this
issue. While increases in investments occurred in a number of other sectors from
2004 onwards – as previously seen in Figure 2.3 – it is difficult to isolate the
impact that CIPI in the food industry had on these investments. 
As argued in Section 2 concerned with the national context, the new government
of 2004 adopted a number of policy reforms in the areas of taxes and customs and
made the business community feel less apprehensive about government. This has
had a positive impact on overall investment levels. To what extent are these
increases side effects of CIPI activity in individual sectors? To what extent are they
a response to new horizontal policies? And to what extent are they the outcome of
overall environment changes? These questions are very difficult to answer
because isolation of each factor is impossible. However, we know that state-
business interactions were particularly effective in the food sector and it is
therefore likely that these interactions influenced not only the vertical governance
issues (relevant to the food sector) but also the more horizontal ones.
Hypothesis B.7: Disturbance of CIPI through conflict of interest
between private investors and government will not affect investment if it
has already taken off.
This hypothesis concerns the final phase of the CIPI process. As set out in the
conceptual framework (Section 3), beyond the tipping point CIPI can either be
maintained (scenario A) or be disturbed and collapse (scenario B). In the latter
case, the question is what happens to investment once the alignment of interest
between policymakers and investors is disturbed. 
Initially, scenario A of continuing collaboration between policymakers and private
investors seemed to prevail because the positive surge in investment and exports
strengthened the political position of the policymaker most directly concerned (the
Minister of Trade and Industry). However, from late 2007 to early 2008, signs of
conflict began to emerge as retail food prices were soaring and complaints were
raised in the People’s Assembly on the impact on the poor. The Prime Minister
and Minister of Trade and Industry were being publicly questioned on the issue in
the People’s Assembly as well by public and private newspapers and active
consumer protection groups. Such political pressure can force politicians and
policymakers to distance themselves from the industrialists but there was not
sufficient time to observe whether this would occur. In any case, circumstances
changed again. The high food prices that had caused the tension began to fall in
late 2008 and the global financial crisis and economic downturn began to
dominate government-business discussions. Tracing public-private interaction in
the food sector and tracing the implications for investment are very difficult in
these circumstances. The elapse of more time will not necessarily provide a clear
conclusion because so many things changed at the same time. 
The furniture sector as a whole never reached the tipping point and so the
hypothesis concerning investment in the final phase does not apply. However, we
can examine the hypothesis for the case of Damietta. As pointed out earlier, this
furniture cluster was propelled forward by CIPI and experienced a substantial
increase in investment over 2003–04. In subsequent years, CIPI weakened and
experienced a partial breakdown due to the change of Minister of Industry in 2004
and the change of management and strategic direction of IMC in 2005. The
relationships of mutual interest that existed between local entrepreneurs, the
previous leadership of IMC and the old Minister were eventually discontinued. 
As a result, Damietta as a cluster no longer received the same technical support
as before. The impact of such exclusion would ideally be analysed through
quantitative data on new investments in and exports by Damietta enterprises.
These data were impossible to obtain because there were no separate statistics
for Damietta and exporters were not providing export data. However, news of
international fair participation by Damietta producers and interviews with players
on both sides (government and business) suggest that the region continues to
excel in exports and increase investments. This seems to indicate that the
weakening of CIPI did not have a negative impact on the sector, although it might
have slowed it down a bit. This seems to indicate that when the potential profit in
the subsector is high, the proxy governance granted through CIPI is only needed
temporarily to take the cluster to a new level. 
This case highlights that CIPI is fragile and that the advantages derived from it
can be easily taken away. Nevertheless, while it works, it can be effective in
raising investment to a higher level. Once achieved, CIPI does not necessarily
have to continue. A new economic and political dynamic takes over. 
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Part III Findings from new sectors
8 Sectoral context: communication 
and information technology 
Although the communication and IT sectors are related and operating within the
same institutional framework, it is important to distinguish between the two when
discussing their nature, structure, stages of growth and main players. The brief
overview that follows is based on interviews and sectoral reports.23
8.1 The communication sector
The communication sector consists of two subsectors: communication
infrastructure and diversified applications for mobile and fixed line systems, such
as ringtones, banking services, advertisements and prepaid phone cards among
others. The composition of the two subsectors is very different, giving the
communication industry a bipolar structure. At one end, there is a small number of
large enterprises that have made huge investments in the mobile, fixed line and
internet networks and operate in oligopolistic or monopolistic markets. At the other
end, there is a large number of small enterprises that have invested in internet
cafes and various applications on mobile and fixed line systems. Table A5 in the
Appendix gives a more detailed picture of how the communication sector is
composed. This report concentrates on the large enterprises that build the
communications infrastructure and networks. Without their big investments, few
other communications or IT enterprises can progress. 
Fixed line, mobile and internet companies can only operate through licences
granted by the government. There are currently three mobile companies (Mobinil,
Vodafone and Etisalat) and one fixed line company (Telecom Egypt – 80 per cent
public). In addition, there are 12 main internet companies, also requiring government
licences. Such licences are acquired through a competitive tendering process.
Figure A1 in the Appendix gives an overview of all licences. In our later analysis,
we will pay particular attention to the negotiation of mobile licences because the
private investments required are huge, and understanding state-business
relationships is critical for understanding how these investments were secured. 
The communication sector went through four phases of development: 
 phase one (1985 to 1995) marking the beginnings of efforts by the 
government to introduce CIT and involve business people in the process; 
 phase two (1995 to 1999) when internet services were privatised and the two 
mobile companies, Mobinil and Vodafone, started their investments in Egypt; 
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23 The sectoral reports include: BSAC (2001); ESCWA (2007); MCIT (1999–2007); MCIT (2005a); MCIT 
(2005b); ITIDA (2006); ITIDA (2007). 
 phase three (1999 to 2004) when most of the institutional framework of CIT 
was put in place following the establishment of the new Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) and the appointment of 
Dr Ahmed Nazif as Minister for CIT; and, finally, 
 phase four (2004 to date) witnessing a change of Minister of CIT, the 
introduction of a third mobile operator and attempts to tender for a second 
fixed line. A more detailed picture of the main changes and of the main 
private and public players of relevance to each phase is presented in Table 
A6 in the Appendix.
8.2 The information technology (IT) sector
The IT sector has four subdivisions: hardware, IT services, software development
and IT-enabled services. The hardware subdivision of the IT sector consists of all
equipment related to CIT – computers, printers, phone sets and other equipment.
IT services involve all kinds of systems integration (hardware and software
services tailored to the needs of a specific project or specific applications). A
smaller but important subsector is software development which is considered to
be the heart of the IT sector. IT-enabled services include call centres and the
outsourcing of business process interpretation. This area is receiving a lot of
attention from both investors and the government and seems to be expanding
fast. It does not require huge investments and at the same time addresses two of
the country’s main problems – unemployment and low export revenues. A more
detailed structure of the IT sector is presented in Table A7 in the Appendix.
IT companies do not require licensed permission as in the case of communication
activities. The main critical component in IT is software programming which relies
primarily on human intellectual efforts and skills. The nature and structure of the
sector is such that the diversity of products is very high. In Egypt, it is also almost
completely demand-driven, with the government being the biggest customer
(representing 50 to 60 per cent of the market). This makes the government
system for ordering IT services, whether through direct orders or tendering
procedures, of key relevance to IT investment decisions.
The IT sector went through the same time phases as the communication sector
but progressed more slowly. From early 1985 to 1999, there were scattered
investments in the IT sector, mostly in hardware and to a limited extent in
software. The years 1998 and 1999 drew more attention to the IT sector with the
creation of MCIT but there were as yet no incentives for investment in the sector.
It was from 1999 onwards that policies – such as free internet for all, a PC for
every Egyptian on subsidised and easy payment terms, no tariffs on imported CIT
equipment, etc. – were adopted by Minister Ahmad Nazif to stimulate the IT
sector. The Information Technology Industry Development Agency (ITIDA), the
institution to regulate the IT sector and support its development, was conceived in
2004. Other initiatives such as e-government made the government an active
buyer of IT services, thus encouraging IT investments to meet this demand. Table
A8 in the Appendix shows the main changes and main players in more detail. 
The impediments to growth faced by the IT sectors are: 
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 limited scope for and scale of subcontracting IT jobs from big to small 
companies because contracts are practically non-enforceable; 
 few effective norms, procedures or quality standards for IT operations;24
 the pool of well-trained human resources is limited in all disciplines (programming,
network engineering, technical consultancy and other technical services); 
 reliance on family enterprise makes it difficult to capture large contracts 
offshored by US or European customers. 
The institutional framework within which CIT operates involves communication law
#10 of 2003 and the rules of three institutions – the Ministry of Communications
and Information Technology (MCIT), the National Telecommunications Regulatory
Authority (NTRA), and the Information Technology Industry Development Agency
(ITIDA). The Minister of MCIT is the Chairman of the Board of both NTRA and
ITIDA; he also chairs the Board of Telecom Egypt, the main provider of fixed lines.
Tables A9 and A10 in the Appendix show the institutional framework in more detail
and provide a critique of the communication law. 
9 Emergence of  CIPI in new sectors
This section is driven by the same hypotheses and follows the same procedure as
those adopted in the corresponding section for the old sectors. In presenting the
evidence from the new sectors, it is important to distinguish between the different
phases mentioned in Section 8 (and Tables A6 and A8 in the Appendix).
Examining the case of the communication and information technology sectors is
not just an additional case study. There is a qualitative difference in that these are
new industries. Their economic viability had yet to be explored and, equally, the
viability of political support needed to be tested. So examining this hypothesis is
particularly challenging. Let us start with the question of whether there was a
common interest. 
As stated earlier, mutual interest means that the investor perceives that the
policymaker has a stake in the investment, in the sense that making it happen and
succeed would enhance the policymaker’s reputation, career or power. In turn, the
policymaker perceives that the investor needs his or her assurance that
complementary action by the state (legislation, infrastructure, services) will take
place. Both sides would lose if the investment did not occur.
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24 The Software Engineering Competence Centre, established in 2001, has as one of its functions to set 
and verify IT standards but it has had only very limited effect – according to our respondents. 
Hypothesis A.1: State-business relations become effective only when
there is a common interest in a sector’s growth and common
understanding of its problems.
The policymakers connected to the CIT industries were not the usual career
politicians or bureaucrats. As will be documented later, they came from a small
pool of specialised Egyptian professionals who believed that the new technologies
had a chance in their ancient country and saw a chance of carving out a career
through supporting the new industries. They could not and did not deal with all
subsectors at once and initially gave most attention to the build-up of a
communications infrastructure for which they particularly needed the involvement
of companies who could make big investments. They could also see that,
provided these companies were allowed to make good profits, the government
would be able to extract duties which could then be used to support other
subsectors. The deals that were made with these companies will be detailed later.
The point to be made here is that the interests of the policymakers varied
between subsectors, depending on their potential at particular stages –
communications first, IT later. Policymakers’ interests also varied between
enterprises of different size, notably in IT. The policymakers were particularly keen
to attract multinational companies to Egypt, notably Microsoft, thinking that this
would lend their work prestige and credibility. Efforts to support small and
medium-sized Egyptian enterprises came later and were weaker.
The big communications and IT companies were willing to make their substantial
investment because they saw the gains that could be reaped from being the first
players in new markets. Realising this potential required certain deals with the
government, such as keeping further competitors out of the Egyptian mobile
phone market for X years, or preferential treatment in tenders for government IT
contracts. The deal-makers on the government side were judged to be credible by
the investors. It was not difficult for them to see that the policymakers’ careers
would depend on the deals being put into practice.
What comes out of the interview material is a picture of a fairly sophisticated
industrial policy focused on establishing a new communications and IT industry. This
is surprising in a country with a poor record in industrial development and industrial
policy. There were two key ingredients to this. The first ingredient has already been
mentioned – the mutual interest of policymakers and investors. The second ingredient
was the common understanding of the problems to be solved. The interviewees
from the private sector stressed that the policymakers they were dealing with had
a good understanding of the technical and economic obstacles to be overcome.
The examination of the next hypothesis will detail where this expertise came from.
In conclusion, the first hypothesis is confirmed. Common interest between
policymakers and investors and common understanding of the problems to be solved
were indeed critical for establishing the new industries. The evidence will emerge
more fully in the course of the next sections. These sections will also show that
this growth coalition was not free from conflict, that there were conflicts within and
between both sides and that success in terms of investment and growth was
uneven among the subsectors and types of enterprise. Exploring these differences
will help to bring some analytical clarity to what has worked where and why. 
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Hypothesis A.2: Common interest between policymakers and key
investors (CIPI) has its roots in a previous informal relationship at the
educational, social or business levels (separately or combined).
By informal linkages, we mean the relationships between the policymakers and
members of the business community before the policymakers came to office.
They range from personal relations, such as attending the same school or being
from the same family or clan, to professional relations such as having worked in
the same field, or having been business associates, or affiliated to the same party
or association. Figures 9.1 and 9.2 provide both a general and a specific look at
such informal relations in the case of CIT. 
First, it is observed that these relations are more professional in nature than in the
case of the traditional sectors where relations were of a more social nature.
Several of the ‘architects’ of the CIT industry came from the Faculty of Engineering
of the University of Cairo. More critical, however, was a common work experience
in a single public institution – the Information and Decision Support Centre (IDSC).
Established in 1985 to support decision-making in the Cabinet with up-to-date
information, IDSC was the first institution to introduce Egypt to the information era
and also operate with private-style management and pay high salaries to its staff.
Some of those IDSC professionals later became the key players in CIT, whether
on the investor or policymaker sides. Other important players in CIT had been
suppliers of equipment and services to IDSC and later occupied important
positions in government. All this is shown in Figure 9.1 which tries to capture
where the key policymakers came from. 
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Figure 9.1 Pathways of key policymakers in CIT
The main overall point, however, is that there were strong informal relationships
between policymakers and investors, that they knew each other from common
professional experience and that in many cases they had been connected to the
IDSC. Figure 9.2 shows the relevance of this connection for major decision-
makers in the public and private sectors. This common history is central for
understanding the interconnectivity of the CIT network, encompassing key
policymakers and industrialists. All interviewees on the public and private sides
acknowledged that this informal link facilitated CIPI and was critical for directing
the attention of a generally conservative government to a new sector.
There is further scattered evidence on strong informal relations between investors
and policymakers. In the early phases (one and two – from the early 1980s to 1999),
two major industrialists, Naguib Sawirass and Mohamed Nosseir, were major
investors in CIT and had strong connections with the Prime Minister at the time
and with other government people. The two mobile phone consortia (the Mobinil
group and the Vodafone group) were led by the same two Egyptian industrialists.
Several of our prime sources mentioned the importance of their involvement for
the substantial investment in the communications industry in the early phases;
however, our respondents were unwilling to elaborate on their relationships with
politicians and policymakers, presumably because these had a murky history. 
Even multinational companies built informal relations with government officials that
contributed to investment, such as in the case of Microsoft. Several interviewees
said that advantages given to Microsoft by the government were due to the strong
relationship between the company’s representative and the first Egyptian Minister
of CIT, Ahmad Nazif. Microsoft was the first to answer his call for moving to the
Smart Village (at the time when there was nothing but desert land). This move
then attracted other multinational and big Egyptian companies, creating what is
now an impressive cluster of CIT companies in the desert but near Cairo.
Microsoft also arranged for a legendary visit by Bill Gates to the same Smart
Village. In return, Nazif signed an agreement with Microsoft that was favourable to
the company – as further analysed below. 
To conclude, there is strong evidence in support of the hypothesis, more so than
in the traditional sectors. Despite the fact that both communication and IT are new
sectors, previous informal relations exist not only between policymakers and
investors, but also among policymakers themselves. Some of those investors
were invited by the top policymakers to occupy – for a finite period – important
positions in government institutions. In contrast to the traditional industries,
previous informal relations are more professional in CIT than social, rooted in
previous common work experience. 
Combining the results of examining the first and second hypotheses, we can
conclude that there was a public-private alliance with strong informal roots, common
interests and a common understanding of the challenges to be addressed. These
attributes, however, were not sufficient to instigate action. Recall the circumstances:
in the 1990s, Egypt’s traditional industries were struggling to compete and the
prospect of establishing entirely new ‘high tech’ industries seemed audacious, if
not absurd, at the time. The ability to take action arose from the fact that the
alliance extended into the centre of power –the presidency of the Republic. Both
the President and his son, chairman of the influential policy committee of the
National Party, supported the new initiatives. We could not interview them to
ascertain whether this support came from a concern to improve security (for which
CIT is critical) or to promote industrial development. It was probably both. 
We can however conclude that the support was sustained over time, seen most
clearly by the fact that the first Minister of CIT, Ahmed Nazif, eventually became
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Prime Minister in 2004. This made a difference, particularly in terms of completing
the institutional infrastructure in the IT sector. The need for an institution responsible
for developing the IT sector and upgrading the capabilities of IT enterprises was
recognised by policymakers and called for by investors early on, but the decision
to establish ITIDA was only taken in 2004 and the institution became operational
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Figure 9.2 Relationships between key policymakers and business leaders 
in CIT
in 2007. This action was long overdue, taken only when Nazif became Prime
Minister. He could not pull it off earlier because the Minister of Finance and other
Cabinet colleagues remained unconvinced of the case for promoting an IT industry.
Only when Nazif became Prime Minister and created an alliance among several
ministers was he able to take action. Figure 9.3 shows the investment-friendly circle
of decision-makers relevant to CIT – similar to that supporting the food industry. 
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Figure 9.3 The network of key public decision-makers in CIT
The existence of this network does not mean that it always works smoothly.
Frictions arose between policymakers due to different priorities and rivalries. For
example, the Minister for Administrative Development and the Vice Minister of
Communication both wanted to be seen as ‘fathers’ of the e-government project
and thus slowed it down even though it was central to the build-up of Egypt’s IT
industry. Relationships can also become too close and closed. The Minister of CIT
is chairman of three organisations – Telecom Egypt, NTRA (regulating body) and
ITIDA (promotion body). While this brought advantages to some stages of the
decision-making processes, one of the interviewed policymakers felt that this
arrangement did not allow sufficient space for new thinking and talents. Some
respondents from the IT sector felt that re-energising was needed. While
advances in the communications industry had been rapid, the IT sector had
progressed only slowly. It is difficult for us to judge whether the lower importance
given to the IT sector was due to its lower profit potential or the greater difficulty of
dealing with a fragmented sector.
When asked about the origin of the CIT sectors, all respondents singled out the
big contribution made by Ahmad Nazif as the first Minister of CIT. It was his
initiative to (a) create a strong government team with the required knowledge and
experience and (b) work with the private sector in developing infrastructure,
legislation and capacity. It is therefore tempting to conclude that the creation of
CIPI was a quick process.
A more detailed examination reveals that the process took over ten years. While
Nazif’s appointment was a milestone in the formation of a sectoral CIPI, the
process started in 1985 with the establishment of IDSC. Its managing director at
the time was an IT professional from the private sector. He promoted the concept
of CIT and planted the idea of establishing a CIT industry in the country. Since he
was directly affiliated with the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, he was in a position
to do so.
Phase two (1995 to 1999) witnessed intensive efforts to initiate the institutional
reform favouring CIT. A White Paper suggesting steps to initiate Egypt’s journey
down the CIT track was prepared with a number of private business people who
also led the Egyptian Software Association. IDSC was involved in this process as
well. The White Paper asked for a separate committee within the old Ministry of
Transportation and Communication to be responsible for CIT – on the grounds
that the new CIT required more professional expertise and deeper business
involvement than available in the old Ministry. It was on the basis of this
recommendation and intensive lobbying by private sector players reaching up to
the President of the Republic himself and his son, that a fully fledged separate
Ministry of CIT was established. So there was a history of involving Egypt’s top
business people (who had gained CIT experience locally or abroad) and obtaining
political support from the highest level. The 1998 conference to present the
strategy for developing CIT was chaired by the President personally.
To conclude, as in the case of the traditional sectors, this hypothesis has only
been partially confirmed. CIPI is fuelled by changes in government figures but is
not necessarily a short-term process. In the case of the new sector(s), the
appointment of a new Minister – who had a strategy of working with the business
leaders – was a milestone, but it was preceded by ten years of exploration and
building a state-business alliance focused on CIT. 
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Hypothesis A.4: Initial interactions between key policymakers and
investors are informal and then become institutionalised as the alignment
of interests becomes clearer.
Hypothesis A.3: CIPI creation is a short-term process and triggered by
changes in government appointments.
In the course of examining the previous hypotheses, it became clear that there
were strong informal ties between key players from the public and private sectors.
These informal ties were not of the traditional type (same family, clan or town) but
of the modern type – same professional background. This came from having
studied CIT-relevant subjects (often at universities in the US or Western Europe),
or from having worked together on CIT-relevant projects in the University of Cairo,
in IDSC or the private sector. Some of our respondents had moved between these
organisations. They shared a passion for exploiting CIT opportunities and to do
this in or for Egypt. They were proud to be members of a professional elite that
cared about their country but at the same time did not neglect personal ambition.
The rewards were profit and power. The successes and failures of this alliance in
establishing a new industry are analysed later. Here we concentrate on the issue
expressed in the hypothesis: to what extent and at what stage was the informal
interaction institutionalised? 
Before the establishment of the Ministry for CIT in 1999 the interaction was
largely informal – even though there were some formal meetings such as
workshops or conferences. The new Minister then took the interaction to a new
level. He set up working groups which were tasked to develop action plans for
specific issues such as infrastructure, legislation, and so on (see Table 9.1). The
working group participants included government officials, business people,
consultants, researchers, and expatriates. Our respondents stressed that these
working groups were critical for translating the Minister’s CIT vision into a credible
plan for action. They provided the essential inputs for the national CIT
development plan, which was both ambitious and down to earth, and was
officially announced in 1999. 
The brainstorming through working groups started as an informal arrangement
behind closed doors involving a handful of players. It quickly became semi-
institutionalised in the sense that meetings were no longer behind closed doors
and minutes were taken, but the process was never formally established. What is
interesting to observe is that although this brainstorming remained informal, it was
applied later in other plan preparations as well.
The main objectives of the 1999 national plan as announced by MCIT are
presented in Table A11 in the Appendix. The table also shows the objectives set
out in the government’s CIT strategy for 2007–10. This explicitly specifies public-
private partnership as a mechanism for implementation. In a way, this formalises
the concept of working groups. It is not, however, fully institutionalised and remains
an ad hoc mechanism used whenever relevant. For example, working groups
consisting of key public and private sector players, were used in the process of
developing the official development strategy for the IT sector for the period 2007–10.
The strategy of involving the key private sector players and constructing a
common interest continues to be used by key CIT policymakers in both informal
and formal ways. For example, major private companies are on the Board of
ITIDA but controversial issues are discussed beforehand with these companies –
and deals are made – in order to ensure their support in the decision-making and
implementation process (interview with first ITIDA chairman).
A more structured transformation of the informal processes into formal ones is
seen in the establishment of a CIT export council – similar to the ones established
for the food and furniture industries and other sectors. It is an official channel for
private sector opinions to be conveyed to the government concerning the export
of IT products and services, and is gaining increasing interest from policymakers
because of the potential to raise export revenues. 
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To conclude, the research on the communication and information technology
sectors confirmed the hypothesis. As in the case of the food industry, initial
interactions between policymakers and investors were informal and were then
institutionalised – but only partially so. The working groups were like temporary
task forces. They proved effective in bringing together the key public and private
sector players and were imitated later in other CIT initiatives and other Ministries.
However, this is different from the permanent institutionalisation through Councils
which has also occurred (Food Council, CIT Council). Interestingly the ad hoc and
temporary institutions were particularly effective when major new challenges
arose.
10 Impact of  CIPI in new sectors
In this section the validity of each of the hypotheses presented in Section 4 is
tested against reality in the CIT sectors; only the sequence in which they are
examined is altered. 
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 61
63
Hypothesis B.1: CIPI plays its role through providing proxy governance
benefits to specific sectors or subsectors.
Table 9.1 CIT Working groups 1999–2000 
Issue addressed      Objectives                           Members     Total duration 
and frequency
Infrastructure Development of (25–40) 
infrastructure to cater to key (15) 
needs of all operations 
Legal Reach the legal (10–12)
framework that backs the key (5) A total of six months
development of the sector – meetings once a
week at beginning
then once a month
Quick wins Business offerings to be (15–20)
immediately provided to key (8)
the market
Human resources Human resources needs (15) Inactive
As in previous hypotheses, we need to distinguish between different phases and
make it clear whether we are analysing the communications and information
technology sectors separately or together. It helps to start with the latter and with
the period dominated by Ahmad Nazif as the first Minister of CIT. All interviewees
agreed that he managed to grant quick policy advantages to CIT as a whole in the
form of lower taxes on computers and IT equipment, easy customs clearance,
quick approvals from different ministries and national security authorities. This has
had a positive impact on attracting investment into the industry as a whole. Nazif’s
ability to push for policy changes came from two sources: (1) his previous work in
IDSC in close collaboration with private investors and (2) the fact that the
President personally gave him the green light for action because he was convinced
of the importance of CIT for Egypt. ‘He kept the hands of the government away
from the sector’ were the exact words of one of the key interviewees about the
positive role played by the first Minister of Communication. What he meant was
that Nazif was able to sidestep the old government bureaucracy.  
Proxy governance took many different forms. In the communication sector it
consisted of granting licences to some investors and not others, granting specific
technical or cost advantages to protect one or more players against the competition,
and also introducing or postponing licences for new communication applications.
Proxy governance in the IT sector was different. It consisted more of early
informal access to the information and technical terms relating to tenders before
those tenders were formally announced. It also provided informal access to the
government authorities involved in actually setting the technical terms for tenders
for IT projects, while remaining potential and actual applicants for the same
tender/s. More traditional types of proxy governance in the form of policy changes
favouring the IT sector such as lower taxes on IT equipment and others were also
evident.
Interviews with government officials and investors – who insisted on remaining
anonymous – mentioned many specific examples of such proxy governance
prompted by CIPI. 
Examples from the communication sector
The examples and most of the details presented in this section are first-hand,
coming from respondents who participated in the negotiations between
government and companies. 
The entry of Mobinil as a second licensed mobile company
The first example refers to the year 1997 and concerns the competition for a
licence to operate a mobile phone network in Egypt. The original scheme was for
one licensed mobile company to compete with the publicly owned Telecom Egypt.
Vodafone and Mobinil consortia were competing for this one licence. Vodafone
won the tender by offering a higher licence fee and superior technical terms. Upon
losing the tender, Mobinil managed, through the strong personal relations of its
consortium leader, the industrialist Naguib Sawiress, and with support from
specific government officials, to strike a deal with the government whereby Mobinil
became the second licensed mobile company – instead of Telecom Egypt – in
return for paying the exact same licence fee as Vodafone. Vodafone now had to
compete with another private company and not a public company as originally
planned. This means that the technical terms of the whole tender were changed
ex post, putting the old winner Vodafone at a disadvantage. 
To further add to the disadvantage of Vodafone, Mobinil took over the 700,000
subscribers to the original public company Telecom Egypt and the existing
infrastructure at cost price and got permission to start operating before Vodafone.
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The deal violated all the rules but was forgotten over time, as Mobinil proved to be
a worthy competitor to Vodafone and the arrangement with two private mobile
companies proved successful. The price was, however, the exclusion of Telecom
Egypt for good from any mobile activity, which is seen by some analysts as
restrictive.
With help from its own political connections and technical justification, Vodafone
managed to get concessions from the government as compensation for the
unanticipated change in the government position, notably that no further
competitor would be allowed for at least five years. Once agreed upon in private
negotiations, it was then publicly announced as a government decision. Since the
decision benefits the intruder Mobinil just as much as it does Vodafone, the latter
still felt unfairly treated by the whole process. This last point raises the question of
why Vodafone went on with the deal despite this unfairness and the answer lies in
the profit potential of the whole project, a point which is further discussed below.
The third mobile company joining the market in 2007
The third mobile line was tendered in 2007. From many competitors, it was
Etisalat that won the tender with a huge licence fee, 600 per cent more than the
one paid by Vodafone and Mobinil back in 1996, which reflects a more
experienced Egyptian government as a negotiator. Proxy governance in this case
consists of advantages granted to the newcomer after winning the licence to
reduce the risk of entry to, and grant some level of competitive positioning in, an
already established market. According to the experts interviewed, it is not
uncommon for such support from the government to exist; what is uncommon is
for the government, represented in NTRA, to pressurise the existing mobile
companies and Telecom Egypt to grant permission to use their physical networks
at a low price. The norm is for the existing companies to strike commercial deals
with the new competitor and not be forced to concede low prices. 
The NTRA is believed to be granting those advantages because the new player is
a major gulf company connected to the Emirates royal family which, in its turn,
has strong relations with the presidential family in Egypt. Also, pressure from
above is made easier by the fact that the institutional structure is centralised
around the person of the Minister of Communication. It is interesting to note that,
while the companies were pressurised, the end result is of benefit to consumers
as three companies are now competing to provide the service and overall prices
in the mobile market decreased as a result. Despite all the complaints, neither
Mobinil nor Vodafone considered divestiture because the profits are still substantial. 
The overall point is that these were major state-business deals that required big
public commitments and resulted in big private investments. In spite of considerable
risks, the projects went ahead because both sides had a clear understanding of
the political, economic and technical aspects and both sides accepted and
respected that there was a common interest. The private companies realised that
the government had to make this deal work because the government executives’
reputation for getting things done was on the line. These public executives were
confident that the private companies would not pull out because the profit
potential was high. The tenders give the impression of governance based on rules
but relationships play an important role in the final stage of the process. 
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It remains to be seen whether a similar deal – based on a strong public-private
relationship and common interest – emerges from the tender for a fixed line, to be
decided in 2009. 
Examples from the IT sector 
In this section the validity of each of the hypotheses presented in Section 4 is
tested against reality in the CIT sectors; only the sequence in which they are
examined is altered.
The IT sector is different from the communication sector. It is more heterogeneous
and each subsector has a different constellation of players. Also, investment
requirements and barriers to entry are much lower. These differences have
implications for the nature of proxy governance relevant to the IT sector. Unlike
communication, where proxy governance rotates around granting licences, in the
case of IT, it consists more of early informal access to the information and
technical terms relating to tenders before those tenders are formally announced. It
also provides informal access to the government authorities who are actually
participating in setting the technical terms for tenders for IT projects, while
remaining potential and actual applicants for the same tender/s. Proxy
governance remains, just as in the case of communication, a way of attracting
private investment that otherwise might not materialise. 
Government tenders for IT products
Government departments are the main customer of the IT industry, accounting for
60 per cent of all demand, and all government orders come through tendering.
CIPI seems to play a very critical role here. Having been assured confidentiality,
interviewees from the investors’ group explicitly admitted that their close relations
with policymakers are critical for succeeding in the IT domain. In fact, one of them
emphasised that the reason that small enterprises do not get many opportunities
is because they lack the networking and connections that help them overcome
government shortcomings in handling the logistics and technicalities of tenders for
IT projects. 
The tenders typically: (1) give very little time for potential applicants to put
together an adequate team to provide the necessary complete solutions
(diversified specialisations); (2) ask for far too many objectives to be fulfilled within
one assignment and within a very short period of time. With these problems, the
government-standard consultants or consultancy companies that can help.
Through CIPI-based connections, big players in the market learn about the
tenders long before they are officially announced and are often asked on a
friendly basis to contribute to the definition of the technical specifications. The
result is a better-defined tender but, at the same time, a much higher chance for
the relevant players to win the tenders. Often such government tenders are of
considerable size and winning them can assure a company’s operation for years.
This feature of the IT market in Egypt has been cross-checked with a number of
interviewees. The overwhelming view is that small companies with considerable
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expertise prefer to work in the export of IT products and services to neighbouring
Arab countries or overseas. Domestic demand from the private sector is small. And
competing for government contracts requires connections that small enterprises
rarely have. In the words of one of the big successful local investors, ‘if you know
about the government tender when it is officially announced, it is already too late’.
All this could be interpreted as inefficient and corrupt. Sometimes this is precisely
what it is. But this hardly captures the essence of what is going on. In many
cases, the government departments are unable to specify the tenders adequately
on their own. By working out with specific companies exactly what they need, their
own capacity is enhanced and they are more likely to obtain the IT systems they
require. The suppliers are willing to invest time in this process because the
likelihood of obtaining the contract is considerably enhanced though not assured.
It is a transitional arrangement from which both sides gain. 
Grants from ITIDA’s funds 
In order to fund ITIDA (the government agency in charge of promoting the IT
sector), the government decided that 1 per cent of revenues of the three mobile
companies should go to ITIDA. It is a kind of tax. Given that this is an extra
burden on the mobile companies that was not agreed upon initially with the
government, ITIDA’s Chairman informally agreed to give these companies priority
in the allocation of ITIDA funds for capacity-building. For example, if these
companies have plans to train workers in an IT-related domain but have no
budget for it, ITIDA finances it as part of this informal understanding.
In other words, the Ministry has an interest in developing the IT sector, has a
problem in financing it, and seeks a sustainable source of income to do so. The
mobile companies understand the government’s need and accept the 1 per cent
levy in return for influence in development of the IT sector. At the same time the 
1 per cent levy gives them access to public funds for development projects that
exceed their yearly budget. There is common interest and common understanding
of the problem and the solution. A way of funding an important support institution
has been found. It would not qualify as best practice in public finance and it may
need to be changed at a later stage but, at this stage, it works. 
Microsoft agreement with the Egyptian government
The agreement between the Egyptian government and Microsoft was a case of
proxy governance in the form of granting specific property rights. The first Minister
of CIT, Ahmed Nazif, signed an exclusive agreement that gave Microsoft the
status of preferred supplier to government departments and assurance that only
licensed products (no piracy of any kind allowed) would be purchased. In
exchange, Microsoft set up a subsidiary in Egypt (a very visible investment in
Smart Village), offered discounted prices and reinvested part of the revenue from
software sales in Egypt in training for customers’ employees. Originally signed for
five years, the agreement was renewed for another five.
Interviewees were split between those who focus on the direct advantages of the
agreement (cheaper software and trained employees) and others, who see the
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resulting monopoly of Microsoft in the IT market as unhealthy, especially since the
first tier of Egyptian partners for Microsoft (ten companies) also win most
government tenders for customised software and thus leave little room for small
companies. The exact words of one of the interviewees were, ‘the government is
invaded by Microsoft’. A third group of interviewees regard the Egyptian government
as too weak to negotiate a better deal with the world’s biggest software company. 
To conclude, we examined the hypothesis that CIPI played its role through
providing proxy governance benefits to specific (sub)sectors. While confirmation
of the hypothesis could only be inferred from discussions with the interviewees in
relation to the traditional industries, in the case of the new sectors, information
could be obtained directly from the respondents – but usually only on a confidential
basis. The difficulty of extracting information arises because formally there is
governance by rules, in particular through tenders. Such tenders are indeed held
but relationships often matter at the most critical stage. Proxy governance was
clearest in the communication sector where CIPI led to arrangements,
concessions and commitments of mutual interest; the investments at stake were
huge. In the IT sector, proxy governance helped to compensate for deficiency in
institutional capacity. In some cases, the special arrangements extended to
foreign companies. The impact in terms of actual investments is examined later. 
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Hypothesis B.2: CIPI’s proxy governance benefits influence investors’
decisions to invest more than the general enabling environment does.25
The key finding concerning this investment is that both national and multinational
companies (usually the hardest to attract) started making substantial investments
in Egypt well before the 2004/5 horizontal policy changes aimed at improving the
general business environment. All investors interviewed, particularly the ones
entering in the 1990s, stressed that their investments were based on future profit
opportunities perceived either by them or their collaborators inside and outside
Egypt. However, the arrangements made with state actors were considered
critical in providing assurances (against concessions) that returns from the
investments could be reaped. 
The clearest evidence in support of the hypothesis comes from the cases of
Vodafone and Mobinil. These two mobile companies commenced operation in the
second half of the 1990s – long before the general improvements in the business
environments. While their early investments in the 1980s were scattered, small
and of limited risk, their investments in mobile lines involved major capital-
intensive physical infrastructure. 
Equally interesting is the fact that these investments involved foreign partners and
even multinational companies as well. In other words, it was not merely local
investment that started early on, in the absence of an enabling environment, but
also FDI, which is known to be cautious and volatile. At the time, the traditionally
defined business environment was plagued with all sorts of problems and serious
attempts at reform had not even started. Even some of the core institutions of
direct relevance to CIT, such as a regulatory body, did not exist at the time. 
25 The hypotheses are the same as for the old sectors but their sequence is different for the new sectors.
Even when the telecommunication law #10 of 2003 was introduced – long after
the companies started operating – it had a lot of deficiencies that left the
investment climate directly relevant to the sector loaded with ambiguities and grey
zones that discouraged investment. An Egyptian legal expert exposed these
deficiencies in general comments and a critique of specific articles, presented in
table A6 in the Appendix. Yet companies continued to invest and still do. 
The key message here is that investors operated on the basis of CIPI-induced
proxy governance which addressed their immediate needs more than the general
business environment did. In the short and medium term this turned out to be
effective. Improving the general business environment is not therefore
superfluous; it remains a valid ambition for the long term. 
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Hypothesis B.3: CIPI has an inclusive positive impact on the sector only
where the private sector has high organisational capacity.
In order to examine this hypothesis we need to start by introducing the private
collective actors in CIT. The main business association is EITESAL (Egyptian
Information Telecommunications Electronics Software Alliance), founded in 2004
as a result of the merger between the Egyptian software and hardware
associations. EITESAL has about 250 members. Then there is the Chamber of
Communication and Information Technology (under the Federation of Egyptian
Industries) which is a semi-public institution and has around 400 members. 
Interviews revealed that: 
 representation in the business community and collective efforts seem to be of 
more relevance to the IT sector than the communication sector, the latter 
consisting of a small number of companies anyway; 
 the current representation for the business community is weak, as even the 
CIT Chamber – the institution with the greatest representation – represents at
best 20 per cent of the IT community; 
 the organisation of the Chamber into vertical domains (banking, hotels and 
tourism, transport, health and others) is useful and leads to well-attended 
seminars for particular target groups; 
 overall, however, both the Chamber and the Association seem to have very 
modest organisational capabilities; 
 the most influential members are big players in CIT, and the Association and 
Chamber seem of limited benefit to small investors as the leading members of
the Association seek to achieve objectives relevant to their enterprise through
close connections with policymakers in the Ministry and other institutions of 
relevance to CIT. In other words, exclusive arrangements are observed in the 
operation of these NGOs and the Chamber. 
This has not always been the case. In the early phases, the Egyptian Software
Association (ESA, now merged into EITESAL) sought to represent to the whole IT
sector and helped with pushing forward some of the key policy changes needed
for the development of the sector as a whole. At the time, the community was very
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small, consisting mostly of the pioneers driving Egypt into the new information era.
In contrast, EITESAL and the Chamber seem dominated by the interests of the big
players and, according to some of our respondents, do little to support the majority of
small enterprises. There are also complex connections between leadership positions
in the EITESAL and the Chamber and official positions in ITIDA (the key government
institution supporting the IT sector), which facilitate exclusive arrangements.
Stronger participation from below can be found in E-LABS. This small association
was established in 2003 and has 33 members. It is very specific in focus (e-learning
content and system development firms), objectives (help members participate in
key national large-scale e-learning projects) and operation (focus on collective
efforts, in order to attain the critical mass required to enable member companies
to enjoy economies of scale, while maintaining individuality and independence). 
E-LABS is well connected – its key founders have strong ties with the Minister of
CIT. The association helps the Ministry set the technical terms of reference for its
e-learning projects. Members know information about the tenders early on plus
detailed technical information that increases their chances of winning. Sure enough,
in the first round of Ministry projects in the e-learning content domain, 90 per cent
were won by members of E-LABS and 70 per cent in the second round. The NGO
sees no harm in providing this privileged information to its members (servicing its
members) because the whole tendering process and applications assessment is
transparent and thus there is no favouritism in the final decision-making.
To conclude, given its extremely oligopolistic nature and limited number of players,
the communication sector is of little relevance to this hypothesis. The IT sector has
a functioning Association and Chamber but representation of enterprises and
organisational capacity of the collective bodies are low. Their leaders tend to use
these organisations for advancing their individual concerns. Collective concerns, in
particular those of small enterprises, are not promoted, except in one sub-sectoral
association. Exclusive arrangements have come to dominate in the sector– in contrast
to earlier periods when representation and arrangements were more inclusive. 
Hypothesis B.4: CIPI plays a critical role in the success or failure of
attracting investment to specific sectors and/or subsectors.
The most striking examples of CIPI’s role in attracting investment to the
communication sector come from the government agreements with Vodafone and
Mobinil and the process of introducing the third mobile company. In IT projects, a
different type of proxy governance also revealed the role of CIPI in attracting
investment. The details for these cases were presented in the analysis of
Hypothesis B1. What needs to be stressed here is the absence of direct causality
for investment. CIPI unleashes the profit potential but it is the existence of the
profit potential in the first place that creates the real motive for investment. The
high profit potential26 overrides the risk once the most directly relevant protection
of property rights is granted and process facilitation takes place. This is the most
critical role for CIPI. 
26 Investment in CIT generally has a high return, according to all interviewees’ and general information 
on the sectors.
An example in support of the above argument is the case of Vodafone which
continued with the agreement with the government despite the obvious bias
towards the other company Mobinil and the ex post changes to the tender terms.
Officials interviewed in Vodafone clearly stated that this multinational company
continued to invest because of the profit opportunity that came with being a
pioneer in the Egyptian mobile market, at the time still a virgin market with a 75
million population. Vodafone International started to enter new markets as its old
market in the UK approached saturation. It was the profit potential here, as ever,
that attracted the investor. However, as set out earlier, the government made
entry into the Egyptian market difficult. The problems were resolved through
concessions on both sides. Without CIPI, the negotiation would probably have
failed. The Chairman of the bidding consortium was a businessman with strong
political and business connections to key figures in government. In other words,
CIPI facilitated the process of negotiating and finding credible mutual assurances
– not for ever but for five years. The arrangement was temporary but sufficient to
trigger the major investment – to be evidenced later. 
To conclude, the finding in CIT is the same as in the food sector. CIPI seems to
play a critical role but is not the underlying cause for the investment. CIPI helps to
remove obstacles and provide assurances which then trigger the investment. 
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Figure 10.1 Annual real investment in communications, 1997–2008* (in
million Egyptian pounds)
* Until the end of November 2008
Source: GAFI – Nominal investment data deflated by authors
Hypothesis B.5: CIPI-induced investment reaches a tipping point which
is a specific point in time when investment starts responding in a
significant way (taking off).
The communications sector is different from other sectors as the main component,
‘the infrastructure’, does not result from a continuous flow of investment but
comes in big lumps at different points in time. With this reservation in mind, it is
observed in Figure 10.1 that big increases in investment occurred in both 1998
and 2006. The first is associated with the introduction of the physical infrastructure
of the first two mobile companies (Mobinil and Vodafone), while the second is
associated with entry of the third mobile company (Etisalat). 
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Between 1998 and 2006, and after 2007, there were significantly fewer, yet larger,
investments. These were still categorised as ‘comunications’ but classified as
communication applications on mobile and fixed lines (such as entertainment,
ringtones, banking, advertisements, prepaid phone cards and others). 1998
qualifies as the tipping point because the investments that followed would not
have been possible without this first initial infrastructure base (see also the
transformation in the communications infrastructure presented in Table 10.1).
Investment in IT is demand-driven and the government is the main customer (no
less than 60 per cent). Total IT investment, however, is difficult to measure
because there is a sizeable informal sector involving individuals working from
home who are not accounted for in official statistics. Keeping these technical
reservations in mind, there was a boost in IT investment in 2005 (Figure 10.2),
particularly in the areas of hardware, software applications and IT-enabled
services (specifically, call centres).
Figure 10.2 Annual real investment in IT sector, 1997–2008* (in million
Egyptian pounds)
* Until the end of November 2008
Source: GAFI – Nominal investment data deflated by authors
Can 2005 qualify as a tipping point? As with the food industries, not enough time
has elapsed to reach a conclusion. However, while inconclusive, it seems plausible
to suggest that 2005 was the tipping point for the IT sector. From a technical point
of view, the IT sector depends on investments in communications (notably IT-
enabled services such as call centres) and the latter did indeed precede IT
investment. Initiation of the e-government project in 2004 also preceded the rise
of IT investment. So, in terms of sequence, it all makes sense but we cannot rush
to conclusions because the substantial increase in investment in 2005 is followed
by a substantial decrease in 2007. More time needs to elapse before conclusions
can be drawn.
As stated in Section 3 on the conceptual framework, the notion of the tipping point
leads us to ask whether there was a one-off increase in investment or a turning
point signalling that the industry had reached a new higher level and had reached
‘take off’. Most interviewees were optimistic in this respect, suggesting that the
rapid advances in the communications sector and the completion of the
institutional framework of direct relevance to the IT sector – notably, establishment
of ITIDA – would increase the attractiveness of the sector for investment. Others
drew attention to remaining obstacles, such as the underdeveloped quality
standards for IT operations, the limited pool of well-trained human resources, and
the reliance on family enterprises. 
All however stressed that the government – by working closely with the private
sector – played a key role in the past and would continue to play an important role.
In the words of one respondent, who had played a major role in the establishment
of the IT sector on both the private and public sector sides, ‘the IT sector is on the
runway ready to take off but hasn’t taken off yet’. In his view, if there is a change
of Cabinet and a new Prime Minister who is less interested in CIT takes over, the
sector might slow down as it still needs a lot of institutional upgrading. This
statement cautions against drawing a conclusion on this hypothesis, but can also
be seen as reiterating the role played by CIPI in overcoming the institutional
weaknesses, and constraints upon growth of the sector. 
Indeed, while the tipping point remains hard to pin down, there can be no doubt
that Egypt now has a substantial CIT industry in which national enterprises play a
major role. A new industry has been created in the course of a decade. In most
industrial sectors, Egypt has fallen behind comparable countries but in CIT it
pulled ahead (IMC, 2005 and unpublished sectoral studies commissioned by IMC
in 2004). Some of the advances in CIT are captured in Table 10.1. 
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Hypothesis B.6: The tipping point is followed by a knock-on effect,
whereby local investment in the sectors concerned attracts FDI and
stimulates investments in other sectors.
While the first part of the hypothesis found some confirmation in the case of the
food industry, in the case of CIT there seems to be a knock-on effect in the
reverse direction. Foreign firms, in particular multinationals, invested first. They
were then followed by local investors, either in the form of partners to
multinationals or independent local players, and by more foreign investors. This is
mainly due to the high technology features of the industry itself.
In the communication sector, the first approved mobile company was Vodafone
International. Its approval led to the entry of Mobinil, which is an Egyptian
company but with a French multinational partner. Together they made the big
investments in infrastructure. The third mobile line winner is an international
company from the United Arab Emirates, so the sector is encouraging more
foreign players. The attractiveness of the Egyptian market is confirmed by the
huge fees paid to the government to get the licence. The third line company paid
US$3 billion to get the fee while Mobinil and Vodaphone paid only US$0.5 billion
each, but that was a decade earlier. The smaller investments in communications
applications were all local and relied on the existing communications
infrastructure. In other words, heavy investment in the technically demanding
areas came mostly from foreign investors while the rush of local investment was
in the less technically sophisticated domains.  
In the IT sector, following the agreements between Microsoft and the Egyptian
government, further agreements followed with Oracle, IBM and others. Additional
examples of foreign investment can be found among the new entrants to the
promising field of call centres. The first to invest was Exceed, a big company
owned by Telecom Egypt and the multinational company Orange. They were
followed by Indian investors and others seeking to benefit from cheap Egyptian
labour. There were also Egyptian investors establishing call centres for the
domestic market. 
In conclusion, largely due to technological and financial barriers, foreign
investment played a significant role, particularly in the early phase, and then
pulled in national investment. In the communications sector this was more
pronounced than in the IT sector. The knock-on effects for investment in other
sectors is difficult to assess for the same reasons as those relating to the old,
long-established sectors. 
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Table 10.1 Some key performance indicators of the CIT industry, 1999–2007
Sector/subsector Unit 1999 2007 Growth rate 
1999–2007 (%)
Communications
Telephone fixed Million 4.9 11.16 127.8
lines in operations
Total cellular mobile Million 0.654 29.368 4390.5
telephone subscribers
Fixed lines Tele-Density % 7.6 15.14 99.2
Total cellular mobile % 1 39.77 3877
Tele-Density
Waiting list for fixed lines Thousands 1265 25.934 -98
Total public pay phone Thousands 13.305 56.444 324.2
cabins
Internet
Internet users Million 0.3 8.29 2663
Internet users/100 inh. % 0.58 11.225 1835.3
Int. internet bandwidth MBps 0.02 14556 72779900
Int. internet bandwidth/ MBps 0.038 1.974 5094.7
10,000 inh
Information technology
Established companies in Company 266 2327 775
IT and communications
Established companies in Company 0.42 3.151 650 
IT and communications/ 
100 thousand inhabitants
IT clubs Club 30 1593 5210
Source: Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (1999 and 2007 monthly indicators)
Not enough time has elapsed for a full examination of this hypothesis. However,
there is some evidence to support the hypothesis in the case of communications
but it is doubtful with respect to IT. 
In 2007 there were serious conflicts between Vodafone and Mobinil on the one
hand and the government on the other, due to the preferential treatment given to
EITESAL, the new entrant to the mobile market. However, the two established
companies continued to operate and the three companies are now involved in
tough competition within an oligopolistic setting. The high profits involved (35
million subscribers to mobile services up to the end of 2008 and the potential for
more) are the main reason for investment to continue even though the earlier
arrangement made possible by CIPI is disturbed. The rooting of investment in
heavily capital-intensive infrastructure discourages divestiture.
As regards the IT sector, the discussion of Hypothesis B6 showed the importance
of CIPI for overcoming constraints. While much has been achieved, there are
further obstacles to be overcome. A strong alliance between top policymakers and
investors remains important. Some IT sector interviewees expressed concerns for
the sector’s future if there were to be a change of Prime Minister. So it remains to
be seen whether the hypothesis is confirmed. Only time will tell. 
It is also possible that, even if the old alliance remains in power, it may cease to
be as effective as in the earlier phase. While relationships in the earlier network
were close, there was fluidity. On the government side, some rigidity has crept
into the system with the centralisation of power in the Minister of CIT. Apart from
being Minister, he is also the Chair of the Board of the regulatory authority NTRA,
and Chair of the Board of the promotion agency ITIDA. As indicated earlier, some
of our respondents thought that this slowed down the decision-making process
and that ‘new blood’ was needed. Again, only time will tell whether and how CIPI
survives and benefits investment and growth in the CIT sectors. 
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Hypothesis B.7: Disturbance of CIPI through conflict of interest
between private investors and government will not affect investment if it
has already taken off.
Part IV Conclusions
This report contributes to a broader Centre for the Future State research
programme into how public action can stimulate private investment. Conventional
approaches to improving the investment climate by strengthening formal political
and market institutions have had limited impact. The Centre’s PAPI programme
explores the potential for informal relationships between politicians/policymakers
and private investors to compensate for weak formal governance arrangements in
the short to medium term. This report investigates the role played by such
relationships in Egypt, with particular reference to two old sectors (food and
furniture) and two new sectors (communication and information technology).
Despite efforts from the 1970s onwards to improve the investment climate in Egypt, the
level of private industrial investment remained low and erratic. However, from 2004
onwards there were increases in investment in most industrial sectors. These coincided
with a change of government in mid-2004, and the appointment of businessmen to
ministerial positions for the first time since 1952. The government introduced a
number of important regulatory changes, long demanded by the business
community. But this does not explain why investments were higher in some industrial
sectors than in others, or how important remaining constraints including corruption,
slow judicial processes and poor contract enforcement were overcome. There is also
the puzzle of why some industrial sectors experienced substantial investment and
growth even before the business-friendly government of 2004 came to power. 
This research report has shown that informal relations between key policymakers
and investors played an important role in increasing levels of private investment in
the sectors concerned but also warns against overstating this role. In order to
bring out the full spectrum of findings, Section 11 draws out the commonalities
and differences between the sectors and Section 12 brings out the implications for
policy and future research.
11 Commonalities and differences
As stressed in the brief assessment of the literature in Section 1, there is little
research on whether – in contemporary developing countries – informal state-
business relationships matter for investment, how the causal connections operate,
under what conditions they are effective, where the informal relationships come
from, how their institutionalisation affects outcomes, and what all this means for
policymaking. What follows are our answers to these questions. Some of these
conclusions are clear, based on strong evidence; some are tentative, recognising
that the evidence is only indicative; and on some issues, we have no answers at
all, but offer better questions for future research.
Causes and triggers
Previous sections emphasise that common interest and common understanding of
problems to be solved are essential for effective state-business relationships – for
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which we used the abbreviation CIPI. The research shows clearly that CIPI is not
the sole direct cause of an increase in private investment but plays a critical role
in unleashing the profit potential of specific sectors. It can unblock the way
forward in the short to medium term where governance of the economy is
problematic. The food sector in particular showed that the direct reason for the
increase in investment was increased demand but the ability to overcome general
supply constraints and make effective investments owes much to CIPI. Whether
the power of demand would eventually have removed these constraints is hard to
tell. It would certainly have taken more time.
Overcoming barriers
CIPI provided what we called proxy governance, consisting of measures tailored
to the specific needs of the (sub)sector. CIPI also facilitated difficult, politically
sensitive decision-making, such as the removal of restrictions on the access of big
investors to reclaimed desert land, and removal of the energy subsidy. This
emerged most clearly from the analysis of the old sectors. 
The barriers that needed to be overcome were more formidable in the case of the
new sectors. CIPI played a critical role in helping Egypt to establish impressive
communication and information technology industries, virtually from scratch.
Specifically, it helped the country overcome the initial barriers to entry, whether of a
technical nature, security-related,27 or even just the mental blocks (translated into
red tape) of conservative technocrats. Later on, it helped to get over the institutional
deficiencies, limited experiences and capabilities of Egypt. Such actions and
surges would have been difficult if not impossible in a country that in many ways
was falling behind Asian competitors and even some other countries in the region. 
Multinational companies have played a significant role in the creation and
sustainability of the CIT industries in Egypt. Their most important role was in the
initial phases of development of the new industry. CIPI played a critical role in
providing proxy governance of direct relevance to these multinationals, thus
attracting their investments. While the role of these companies at a later stage
remains controversial, they lent credibility to the efforts of the public-private growth
alliance in the early stages. 
While not all CIPI actions were necessarily in the right direction, and corruption
may not have been completely avoided, the fact remains that Egypt now has a
substantial and viable CIT industry. The role CIPI played in developing the
industry is gradually receding as the institutional framework becomes more
developed and industrial structures and capabilities become stronger.
Willingness and ability to take action
In both the old and new sectors, the close alliance between high-level policymakers
and big investors was able to play a key a role because the alliance extended into
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27 National security issues (due to technical issues relating to wavelength and interactions with defence 
and intelligence etc.). 
the Cabinet and, in the case of the CIT industries, up to the President. This helps
to explain why willingness to take action translated into a capability to take action.
It is impossible to determine how effective the alliance would have been without
this extension to the top. 
The willingness of policymakers to take action in favour of a certain sector is
conditional upon the potential of the sector itself, and the extent to which it can
deliver visible and tangible results in terms of economic growth, exports and job
creation for which policymakers can take credit. This explains why policymakers
took particular interest in the food sector (especially the processing of fruit and
vegetables). In the case of the CIT industries there was also the prestige and
pride in establishing a new industry in a country which is famous for its ancient
history but not for future-oriented high-tech industries. Media criticism seems to
deter ministers from offering exclusive support to particular firms but we are not in
a position to determine how strong this restraining force was. 
Exclusive relationships and inclusive effects? 
Although CIPI initially offers exclusive benefits, it can have an inclusive and
positive impact, but only where the private sector has effective leadership and
broad-based organisation. Thus, in the well-organised food sector, exclusive
relations between policymakers and key investors had a positive impact on large
parts of the sector. In contrast, the leaders of furniture sector have not sought to
develop a broad-based organisation and this seems to explain why the benefits
arising from a close relationship with policymakers were appropriated by a few
leading enterprises. However, the local-level experience of Damietta shows that
the gains extend further when the private sector leaders represent a broad-based
organisation. This connection between the spreading of gains and the way the
private sector is organised requires, however, further comparative research. The
role of other contingent factors needs to be considered.
Beyond the tipping point 
One of the main concerns was to establish whether CIPI just lit a straw fire or had
an enduring effect. The answer was clearest in the CIT industries where a new
industry had been established. The most visible sign is the Smart Village, a
cluster of CIT enterprises and support institutions, not far from Cairo but out in the
desert. However, examining the durability of these enterprises through investment
data and identifying a tipping point proved difficult for a number of reasons: first,
not enough time had passed, particularly in the food industry; second,
investments are lumpy and yearly changes look erratic; and, third, investment
data (obtained from GAFI) are not complete. The investment data provide only
tentative evidence that the industries embarked on a new dynamic. Adding
qualitative evidence from the respondents’ own judgements suggests that the
communications industry and the furniture industry of Damietta had taken off,
while the jury is still out on the IT industry and the food industry. 
Another way of getting at this issue was to examine whether a weakening or
collapse of CIPI would slow down investment and growth. There is no common
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answer across the industries examined. The Damietta furniture industry continued
to grow after the local CIPI came to an end. In the communication industry, where
CIPI was put under severe strain, the growth of the sector continued because
there had been earlier sizeable investment and demand continued to grow, albeit
at a slower rate. In the IT industry, it is difficult to give even a tentative answer.
And, finally, in the food industry the issue does not yet arise because the alliance
has only existed since 2004 and remains intact, at least in the most important
subsector − fruit and vegetable processing.
In spite of this uncertainty, what is beyond doubt is that CIPI has been an effective
transitional arrangement, initiating investment and growth. It remains to be seen
whether and in what circumstances it can also help to sustain this growth.
Transitional arrangements
The notion of transitional arrangements28 is useful for analysing the Egyptian case
material and perhaps also for research on state-business relations in general. As
suggested in the introductory section, the search for best practice (best in all places
and at all times) makes it difficult to recognise ways forward for a particular stage and
to understand sequence and dynamics. The empirical research supports this view.
Rules-based governance is widely considered best practice for raising investment
and generating growth but the Egyptian communication industry suggests that
relationship-based governance was significant in attracting the big early
investments. These investors were then major contributors to the working groups
that drafted the new telecommunication law and laid down the rules for the sector.
Similarly, the food investors – due to their close  relationships with policymakers –
contributed to the horizontal improvements in business regulations. Since these
investors were feeding into a wider policy process, their specific contribution is
hard to document.  Nevertheless, the question raised in the introductory chapter
of whether investors follow or lead regulatory reform seems to have some validity.
Of course, involving business in the drafting of rules and laws is not without
dangers but it seems better to acknowledge that the way forward is potentially
messy than wait for neutral rule-makers to bring about a step change in
investment and growth. 
The roots of CIPI
CIPI is often rooted in informal relationships. In the case of the old sectors, these
roots lay in coming from the same city or extended family. In the case of the new
sectors, these roots lay in a common professional background − career paths had
crossed in universities and work assignments in the public and private sectors.
However, the Damietta experience shows that such relationships are not a
precondition for the development of common interests. What the common social
or professional background does is make it easier to come together and explore
the potential for common interests. Of course, there must be situations where
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28 Stimulated by Qian’s (2003) transitional institutions.
common history has the opposite effect and where old tensions make it difficult to
explore joint futures, but these did not surface in the interviews. 
In the new sectors, the bond between the key public and private players did not just
come from a common past. We also noticed the pride that came from commanding
expertise in a new and difficult technical field, the pleasure that came from applying
things learnt in the US or Europe in their native Egypt, and the belief that the new
technology provided an opportunity for creating a new industry in a country which
seemed trapped in history and in the political conflicts of the Middle East. These
motives, often detectable only through the way respondents spoke about their
experiences, should not be ignored but they are hard to verify. 
Of course, there was also the realisation that there was money to be made in the
private ventures and that new careers would open up in the public sector. Without
the belief in significant business opportunities and career opportunities none of the
socio-cultural factors would have come into play. But in trying to understand why
these growth alliances came together – in the new and old sectors – it would not be
helpful to reduce everything to pecuniary motives. Such a reductionist conclusion
would prevent us from detecting the glue that helped keep CIPI together. Some of
the top policymakers could have made more money in the private sector; in fact
some were successful businesspeople before working in government for a period. 
Necessary conditions
On the basis of the formal interviews and informal conversations, we cannot
disentangle and give weights to the financial and non-financial contributors to the
creation of CIPI. We can however conclude that: 
 Common social roots facilitate the coming together of public and private 
actors but are not a necessary condition.
 Common professional background facilitates the process of developing a common
understanding of the problems to be solved but is not a necessary condition.
 Common interest and common understanding of the challenges are 
necessary conditions for an effective public-private growth alliance.
12 Implications for policy and 
future research
We suggested in the introductory section that there is too much focus, both in the
literature and in real world advice to developing countries’ governments, on the
need for a rules-based enabling environment in order to attract investment, and 
not enough attention on the process of getting there. The key question for
policymakers is therefore how to initiate investment in practice and unleash a new
dynamic. The research presented here cannot give definitive answers but it
indicates a way of triggering a process that accelerates private investment and
which is both politically and economically viable. 
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Short term and long term
This research is not in any way trying to discredit the importance of improving the
investment climates in general. This is a worthwhile long-term goal, but
policymakers must be clear that institutional reform tends to be more difficult and
take more time than the consultants acknowledge. And even when it succeeds it
does not always lead to a surge of private investment. This is the context in which
this research was carried out and this is why we experimented with the approach
first outlined in Moore and Schmitz (2008). 
While CIPI is no substitute for a better formal enabling environment in the longer
term, this research does show how informal relationships based on common
interests can provide investors with the necessary reassurance to kick-start
investment in the short to medium term. It is however important to note that
certain features of the political and economic context in Egypt were significant in
helping to ensure that exclusive benefits were targeted on sectors with the
potential for productive investment, and that some of the more negative effects of
‘crony’ relationships were avoided. Ministers had incentives to deliver on a range
of public goods, not just narrow patronage benefits, and were subject to media
scrutiny. Informal relationships between politicians/policymakers and private
investors are likely to play out quite differently in more difficult governance
contexts, although they may still offer the best way forward.
Organisational capacity
For this approach to work, one needs more than a few committed individuals on
the public and private sides. Both sides need organisational capacity. On the
public side, it is no accident that the impressive public-private alliance for
establishing a new CIT industry was not just spearheaded by a Minister with a
vision. This Minister had been able to set up a new Ministry for which he could
recruit a small but very capable staff, free from the recruitment restrictions and
salary scales prevailing in the civil service. It is no accident that the public-private
alliance for the food industry came into life with a new Minister of Trade and
Industry who was an industrialist and who appointed very capable people to key
positions. And on the private sector side, there was an effective food chamber
and council, with leaders who had a vision for the sector and a clear idea of
where Egypt could fit into the international division of labour. The significance of
this factor became clear when we compared the food industry with another sector
which had high profit potential but little, if any, organisational capacity. The sector
in question is the marble and granite industry, not studied explicitly for this project
but known to us from other work. This organisational capacity of the private sector
seems an important point which is rarely given sufficient attention. Failure to adopt
policies and the failure of policies adopted tend to be attributed to the public sector.
This research highlights the need to give equal attention to private sector failure.29
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29 Considering the organisational strength/weakness of the private sector is important for another reason.
From the public policymakers’ point of view there is a paradox. Old sectors tend to be well organised 
but do not always deserve public support. New sectors tend to be less well organised, because 
enterprises are so young or merely in the process of getting established, but may deserve public 
support (Meyer-Stamer 2004). 
Broad-based organisation of the private sector
The organisation of the private sector influences not only whether policymakers
have a credible counterpart in the private sector, it also influences the outcome of
joint action between the two sides. Broad-based organisations are more likely
than small exclusive clubs to spread gains. Figure 12.1 captures this connection
between the nature of private sector organisation and the likely effects of CIPI-
induced measures. Note that it does not present conclusive results. The findings
are tentative and need further comparative enquiry. Such research would be of
great interest to politicians and policymakers, particularly in countries where
parliament and/or the press scrutinise the effects of close relationships between
policymakers and business people. 
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Figure 12.1 Organisation of the private sector and its effects
Institutionalising state-business relations
The research has shown that informal relationships are not necessarily bad and
corruptive as often assumed in the literature. It has shown how such relationships
evolved and it has contrasted paths and patterns in old sectors (traditional
informal ties based on family and locality) and new sectors (modern informal ties
based on common university, professional and business backgrounds). These
informal roots were a source of strength in the analysed cases, but leave
policymaking with two problems: these relationships are difficult to recreate in
other sectors and their accountability is difficult to organise. The big policy
question is therefore whether and how such relationships can be institutionalised
in an effective way. This question cannot be answered with the information
collected, because institutionalisation was limited.
However, the sectoral experiences brought out the importance of distinguishing
between temporary and permanent institutionalisation. In the early stage of
establishing the CIT sector, working groups were established to deal with
particular challenges. These proved very effective. Once their tasks were
accomplished, these working groups were dissolved. The participants were hand-
picked by the Minister from the informal networks but the meetings were not
secret or behind closed doors. Other ministries later imitated the same working
group system because it was seen as successful for aligning interests, developing
a common understanding of problems and getting the relevant stakeholders
involved in working out ways forward. Specifying the factors that determine the
success or failure of such temporary public-private taskforces would be a useful
exercise. Note that this is not about taskforces in general. It is about taskforces
that bring together those players who really matter and that concentrate on
accelerating investment and fostering competitiveness. 
When it comes to permanent institutionalisation, the Egyptian experiences remain
very limited and our research did not focus on specifying the conditions for
institutional effectiveness. Issues that would need to be considered in future
research include: source of funding; political independence; formal appointments;
informal leadership; location in state apparatus (in particular, relationships with the
Cabinet); how proposals find their way into public action; frequency of meetings;
transparency; and accountability. 
National public-private councils
Institutionalisation at the sectoral level is important but has its limitations: the
issues of sectoral priorities and interdependence are not addressed. This does not
mean that no decisions are made. On the contrary, decisions on these issues are
made all the time but usually through informal arrangements and/or by default.
This is a key problem for policymakers concerned with investment and growth and
concerned with building a better state.
There are no easy solutions, but in recent years there have been interesting
experiments from which lessons can be learnt. The most interesting national-level
experiments are competitiveness councils which have sprung up in several parts
of the world. Competitiveness councils are institutional mechanisms for improving
policymaking in the policy fields concerned with raising a country’s investment,
growth and competitiveness. The councils seek to achieve this by bringing together
key representatives of the public and private sectors, seeking common understanding
of the problems that need to be addressed, and making joint proposals for action.
The scope of issues addressed by such councils and the way they are designed
varies between countries. Ireland, for example, is thought to be a successful
example in terms of improving the policy process and outcomes. Egypt also has a
competitiveness council but it is thought to be ineffective in both respects. Identifying
specific positive and negative lessons (on the issues set out above) would be of
considerable interest not just for Egypt but also for other developing countries.
Financial crisis and economic downturn 
The insights from this research might have some relevance for understanding how
governments are trying to get out of the recent financial crisis and curb the global
economic downturn. While the full effects of the financial crisis on the real
economy are not yet clear, it is clear that belief in the ‘West is Best’ ideology has
lost all credibility. The leading Western countries can no longer claim superior
knowledge or ability in creating an enabling environment for investment and
growth. Nor can they claim to know how to climb out of the crisis. Martin Jacques
might be overstating the case when he concludes that ‘the business and political
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elite are flying blind’ (The New Statesman, 12 February 2009), but measures
adopted so far have merely laid bare further layers of malfunctioning national
systems and the downside of global interconnectedness. 
Seen through the lens adopted in this research on investment and growth in
developing countries, there are two features that demand attention. First, there is
a lot of talk about the need to reform the legal and regulatory framework at the
national and global levels. Second, top policymakers and business leaders from
specific sectors get together to make deals that are in the common interest –
overriding previous rules and conventions. The parallels to our analysis of the
investment climate are striking: first, there is agreement that major improvement in
rules-based governance is essential in the long run; second, relationship-based
governance offers a quicker way forward. 
Recent responses to the financial crisis underline that common interests and
common understanding of the problems to be solved are the basis for quick
action, while concerns with accountability are put on hold. The leaders of big
companies seek government support for their private rescue plans, the political
leaders seek the glory of avoiding massive job losses and rescuing a sector
threatened by closure. The vast majority of enterprises look on in bewilderment,
aghast that the big companies can make new deals while they themselves have
to live by the old rules. But even they recognise that such relationship-based
governance might help to stop a downward and trigger an upward dynamic. 
Normal times and turning points
The state interventions prompted by the recent global financial crisis and economic
downturn certainly suggest that state-business relations need more attention, not
just in developing countries but also in the more advanced Western and Asian
countries. Fundamental questions need to be re-examined, for example: 
 How much progress have North American and West European countries 
made in moving towards rules-based governance? To what extent does 
reality live up to the model that developing countries are asked to emulate? 
 Given that East Asian countries have a superior recent record of investment 
and growth, to what extent have they moved away from relationship-based 
governance? How effective have they been in institutionalising such 
relationships?
These are big questions far beyond the scope of our research report. We raise
them here and now for two reasons. First, research and advice for the developing
world is heavily influenced by what is seen to work in the developed world.
Second, the global financial crisis and economic downturn suggest that we need
to distinguish between two very different situations − normal times and times
when extraordinary challenges arise. Extraordinary times are when major crises
need to be dealt with or huge opportunities arise. These are the turning points in
an economy or sector. Judgement of what kind of governance is effective and
desirable will probably differ depending on whether we are considering normal
times or turning points.
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Research making this distinction will at times struggle to specify where the normal
ends and the extraordinary begins but it is likely that a more realistic picture
emerges of how state and business interact. There is likely to be a clearer
recognition that public-private alliances can play an effective role at turning points
and that informal relationships can provide effective transitional arrangements.
Our research suggests that what matters most is that there is a common interest
and common understanding of the challenge. Once this is recognised, research
can get down to the central task of specifying the conditions that determine
whether a growth alliance has the desired outcome. 
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Table A1 Policy changes of relevance to investment in the period 1974−1997
Main features
While not explicitly discouraging private investment (national and
foreign), the nationalisation of existing private facilities and huge
investments by the government (more than 80% of total investment
particularly in industry) created a general atmosphere of ambiguity
and lack of trust in the government that discouraged all investments. 
Investment law #43/1974 – amended by law #32/1977 – was a point
of transformation in the investment climate and in the Egyptian
economy as a whole. It marked the beginning of the move away from
socialism. The law provided several advantages to investors such as
tax exemptions for five to seven years and imports without the need
for a licence, among others. But the most important advantage was
the guarantee that projects under this law could not be nationalised
or confiscated except due to a serious legal felony and only within
the framework of international agreements. It also encouraged joint
ventures with enterprises that were at least 51% Egyptian-owned.
Free zones were created with additional advantages and the General
Authority for Investment (GAFI) was established to assess projects
and be in charge of all investment procedures.
Law #59/1979 focused on encouraging the establishment of new
cities with the purpose of encouraging new projects and a more even
distribution of the population. The law offered investment projects
located in new cities (Sixth of October and Tenth of Ramadan,
among other cities) a number of advantages, the most important of
which was a tax holiday of ten years. The law did not distinguish
between industrial and commercial projects. 
Law #159/1981, or the companies’ law, was introduced to organise
the establishment of new companies in all activities.
Law #230/1989 for local investments and free zones was introduced
to put local and foreign investors on an equal footing and attempt to
simplify procedures for launching a project. It also specified a number
of priority areas for investment such as land reclamation, tourism and
housing. Industry was also one of the areas but with no specific
focus. 
A comprehensive economic reform and structural adjustment
program (ERSAP) was implemented in Egypt commencing in 1991
under the supervision of the World Bank and the IMF. With seven
components (public sector reform, fiscal and monetary reform,
investment reform, exterior policies, pricing policies, and social
policies), it aimed at regaining Egypt’s macroeconomic stability,
correcting structural imbalances and regaining Egypt’s credibility. It
was a point of transformation for the Egyptian economy.
Improvements in budget deficit, inflation, foreign debt and the debt
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Main features
1) New Tax Law #91/2005 involving substantial reduction in tax rates, 
unification of tax rates, cancellation of surcharges and all previous 
tax exemptions. The law also aims to simplify procedures and regain 
trust between taxpayers and tax authorities.
2) Removal of sales tax from capital goods in 2006 – a disincentive 
to the purchase of all equipment.
1) Decree #770/2005 Issuing the Executive Regulations to Implement 
Import and Export Law #118/1975 – a new Executive Regulation for 
the implementation of Import and Export law #118/1975. While based 
on the same articles that were passed 30 years ago, it attempts to 
accommodate recent factors and Egypt’s commitments to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). The new regulations are to be 
implemented in coordination with 18 other Presidential Decrees, 
Prime Ministerial Decrees, Ministerial Decrees and Laws issued at 
various times. 
2) Customs changes (2004):
 Cuts in customs duties, from 14% to 9%.
 Simplification of customs procedures.
 Consolidation of dutiable items from 13,000 to 6,000.
 Cutting the number of tariff bands from 27 to 6.
3) Free zones and export promotion law #155/2002 – the main 
component of which being an export subsidy fund to encourage 
exports of different products.
4) Trade Agreements 1998−2005 − Egypt signed three regional trading 
agreements (COMESA 1998; GAFTA 1998; and AGHADEER 
Protocol 2004) in addition to eight bilateral trade agreements (the 
most important being the one with the EU (2001) and the most recent 
being the one with Turkey (2005)); all in addition to QIZ Protocol 
(December 2004).
5) Investment Laws 1997−2005 − The investment guarantees and 
incentives law #8/1997 amended by laws #196/2000 and #13/2004, 
and the special economic zones law #83/2002. Law #8 involved a 
number of tax holidays later cancelled by new tax law. A new 
Presidential Decree #30/2005 gives the Prime Minister authority to 
make exceptions if projects are strategic for Egypt.
1) Intellectual Property Rights Law (IPR) – #82/ 2002 − Always 
pushed for by donors as being key to attracting investment.
2) Labor Law #12/2003, amended by Law #90/2005 − Issued in 
replacement of the old law that has been operational from the 1960s.
3) Competition Law #3/2005 and Executive Regulations 2005 − More 
than a decade in the making, Egypt’s first competition law (anti-trust 
law) was finally passed in 2005. It aims at ensuring that all 
commercial activities are undertaken without impairing free 
competition in the market.
4) Consumer protection law 2006 – Focus on establishing a 
Consumer Protection Agency and specifying its responsibilities and 
organisation. This Consumer Protection Agency will be responsible 
for receiving complaints and investigating cases of consumer rights 
violation.
Table A2 Recent policies and strategies for improving the investment and














































increase as well 
Features
Investors testing the water on the
orientation and direction of the
new policymakers in office, to start
lobbying for their needs 
Key investors capable of leading
the sector identified  
Serious detailed discussions
about constraints upon investment
in sector in a typically informal and
confidential setting and involving
the network of responsible
policymakers 
Preparatory work preceding policy
formulation done   
Policy formulation steps out from
behind closed doors to actual
public announcement and
traditional process of adoption
A formal mechanism exists for
inducing changes in policies and
lobbying for the interests of the
sector 
The key investors increase their
investments followed by others
within the same sector
Observing boost in local
investment, FDI starts to gain
more confidence in investment in
the sector 
Confidence in the investment
climate is contagious even if no
actual changes take place 
Key influencing factors30
Previous relations with policymakers such as
common education, family relations, business
acquaintance, social acquaintance, all leading
to mutual trust between two groups
Leadership characteristics of key investors
combined with strategic thinking and vision 
and deep understanding of sector needs
Policymakers with clear understanding of the
needs of the business community, particularly
in relation to specific sectors
Policymakers already knowing each other and
trying to find a way forward that recognises 
the interests of both sides  
Leadership characteristics of key investors
combined with strategic thinking, vision and
deep understanding of sector needs
The characteristics of the policymakers and
their ability to push for changes beyond the
bureaucracy
Constraints to the sector are not only specific 
to the sector but also of a more general nature
(tax reform, customs, etc.)
The characteristics of the market setting,
international conditions of relevance to the
sector,31 the nature of the sector
The level of organisation of the business
community
Inclusive or exclusive arrangements 
Local investors’ affiliation with foreign partners 
The market structure of the sector in question
(monopoly, oligopoly, monopolistic competition
or perfect competition)
International conditions of relevance to the sector
The nature of the sector: similarity to or
linkages with booming sector
Constraints to investment are of a more 
general than specific nature 





























30 Each phase is dealt with separately so, when relevant, some factors are repeated.
31 For example, all other factors being equal, booming demand for a product in the international market is a favourable condition that
speeds up the tipping point because larger investments to satisfy the increasing export demand have a high profit potential.
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Success of sector in attracting
investment, expanding exports
and creating jobs
CIPI positively perceived by
community and media
CIPI evolves into more
involvement of key investors in
policy formulation
Relation between key investors
and policymakers made more
explicit and more formal
Role of key investors expanding to
other areas, within the same
sector, as well as extending
beyond the sector to general
policy formulation
Failure of sector in attracting
investment, expanding exports
and creating jobs
CIPI negatively perceived by
community and media
Policymakers feel threatened by
their collaboration with key
investors
At least a cooling of the
relationship
Potential conflicts between the two
groups as policymakers take
policy actions unfavourable to the
sector in order to boost their
image
Performance indicators of the sector enjoying
benefits of CIPI in terms of investments,
exports and job creation (macro objectives)
The market structure of the sector in question
(monopoly, oligopoly, monopolistic competition
or perfect competition)
The perception of the community and
specifically the media of CIPI (positive or
negative)
The personal characteristics of policymakers
The personal characteristics of the key
investors
International conditions of relevance to the
sector
Performance indicators of the sector enjoying
benefits of CIPI in terms of investments,
exports and job creation (macro objectives)
The market structure of the sector in question
(monopoly, oligopoly, monopolistic competition
or perfect competition)
The perception of the community and
specifically the media of CIPI (positive or
negative)
The personal characteristics of policymakers
The personal characteristics of the key
investors
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Specific action
Completely change the system
for reclaimed land allocation from
the current small slots allocation
to fresh graduates to large slots
cultivated by big investors in fruit
and vegetable processing
– Harmonisation of local 
standards for 2000 food items
with international standards
– Changes in board of directors 
of Egyptian Accreditation 
Council’s Food Division, by 
introducing the active food 
chamber and dissolving the 
inactive representation of an 
old public agency
– Creation of an Agricultural 
Modernization Council that 
consists of big investors from
agriculture and fruit and 
vegetable processing to 
introduce changes in the 
agricultural system that can be 
pushed beyond the typical
bureaucratic structure of the 
Ministry of Agriculture
– Appointing big investors from
fruit and vegetable processing to
Ministry of Agriculture 
committees in the critical areas 
of setting the criteria for new 
varieties of seeds, along with 
others able to approve different
types of pesticides for Egypt32
– Creation of an informal ad hoc
mechanism for solving big 
company problems one by one 
(company registration, customs
clearance problems, training 
needs)  
– Simplification of industrial control
system faced by producers
– Establish an institute to handle 
all issues related to land 
allocation for industrial use, 
including infrastructure 
preparation
– Support Food Chamber claims 
for a unified regulatory system 
and one single food authority
Benefit to specific groups
within the food sector
Action triggered by big
investors in fruit and
vegetable processing to
address the needs of their
lines of production
– Changes triggered by big 
investors in food industries/ 
leadership of Food 
Chamber in the Federation 
of Egyptian industries  
– Clearly triggered by big 
investors to promote 
changes of direct interest to
their business
– Triggered by big investors 
and direct outcome of CIPI 
in its narrow sense. 
Removes obstacles faced 
by investors planting in 
reclaimed land for export 
and/or fruit and vegetable 
processing directed to 
exports 
– Direct gain only to individual
investors with access to the
policymaker, specifically the
big players. The action 
triggered by Minister of 
Trade and Industry to 
facilitate operations of the 
big investors – and gain 
their trust  
– Triggered by big players in 
the sector
– Triggered by big players and
solves a big obstacle to 
investment 
– Triggered by big investors/ 
leadership of Chamber and 
of benefit to their 
businesses but more so to 
the whole
Benefit to the food sector
as a whole
Beyond fruit and vegetable
processing, oil industries,
dairy products, bakery and
confectionery also stand to
benefit. For example, wheat





in the desert. Animal fodder
is also planted in the desert
now. 
– Benefit to the sector is 
well established as 
harmonisation of 
standards is a huge 
barrier between 
producing for the local 
market and producing 
for exports
– Fruit and vegetable 
processing as a whole 
will benefit but only if the
sector is well organised
– The benefit to the sector 
as a whole is established
for the long run because 
it improves the backward 
linkages of fruit and 
vegetable processing with
agriculture 
– Other enterprises within 
the food sector face the 
same problems but have 
no access to the 
policymaker for solution 
– Clear benefit to the whole
food sector for this 
specific act and the ones 
below
Benefit to any other
additional sector
Act seen by experts 
as a step forward for
the agricultural sector.
It allows the adoption
of a new model (large-
scale plantations for
industrial purposes) 
as an alternative to 
the traditional model 
of small farmers/
small plantations in 
the delta area  






– Direct benefit to 
big investors in 
agriculture 
– Big players in other 
sectors besides 
food received the 
same treatment 
– Clear benefit to all 
industry





















32 These two committees are particularly critical for both agriculture and industry. Agricultural authorities see it as their responsibility to decide
what to allow and what not to allow while industry sees internationally accepted restrictions on new varieties of products and also certain 
types of pesticides as obstructions to its expansion as fruit and vegetable processing requires high agricultural flexibility if it is to expand.
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Specific action Benefit to specific
groups within the food
sector
Benefit to the food






– Reduction of customs on all 
imported inputs
– Removal of tariffs on capital 
goods
– Food industries have been 
exempted from 
energy subsidy cancellation
– Facilitating process of service 
delivery to enterprises and 
raising the ceiling of technical 
assistance from 100,000 euros 
to 500,000 euros, depending 
on the size of the enterprise
– Provision of training of workers 
through ITC
– Minimise shock effects by 
announcing changes of 
significance to investors over 
the next five years and 
discussing these changes with 
industrialists in advance (e.g. 
removal of energy subsidy and 
announcement of energy prices
to be paid by industrialists for 
next five years)
– Support Food Chamber efforts 
to reduce the size of the 
informal sector which is known 
to be a danger to the future of 
the industry
– Revision of trade agreement 
with EU to create more 
opportunities for Egypt
– Improving collection and 
precision of import and export 
data collected by GOEIC 
(General Organization for 
Export and Import Control) 
– Change of symbolic commodity
councils into effective export 
councils that do all preparatory 
work for policy changes
– Big players were involved in
preparation of changes 
– Strong pressure by big 
players is behind the 
exemption of food 
– Benefits to specific 
companies from IMC, clear 
bias toward large 
companies
– Important badly needed 
service triggered by the 
needs of big investors 
and provided in full to them
– Had a very positive effect 
on big investors and foreign
investors in achieving trust 
in the system 
– Action triggered by the big 
investors/leadership of 
Chamber, whose 
businesses are negatively 
affected by the informal 
sector
– Action triggered by big 
exporters to the EU to plan 
ahead for the needs of 
this huge market
– Triggered by Food Chamber
and Food Export Council 
and contributes to the 
solution of a chronic 
problem in Egypt 
– An initiative of Minister of 
Trade and Industry but CIPI
is very much at heart of the 
choice of members
– Clear benefit to the entire 
industry
– Benefit to the sector as a 
whole
– Small companies 
theoretically have access 
to the technical support of
the IMC but in reality it is 
at a much lower priority 
level at the institution. 
Small enterprises 
complain about limited 
access
– Of long-term benefit to 
sector but only in a 
limited way because 
access is mostly 
limited to big players not 
the entire sector
– Small players in the 
sector are not part of the 
process but benefit from 
the outcome as future 
uncertainties are reduced
– Very high benefit to the 
sector as a whole
– Of benefit to both 
agriculture and fruit and 
vegetable processing 
exports 
– Of considerable benefit to
the sector as a whole, 
particularly new investors 
and exporters 
– Excellent for both the 
present and future of the 
sector. One of their 
objectives is to reach a 
long-term vision and 
strategy for the sector to 
follow. The Minister of 
Trade and Industry 
adopts the strategy and 
supports its 
implementation
– Reduction of 
customs took place 
on all imported 
inputs and thus 
benefited all 
industrial sectors
– Exemption also for 
textiles and 
garment industries
– Again benefit to big
enterprises from 
different sectors 
– Change of symbolic 
commodity councils 
into effective export 
councils that do all 
preparatory work 
for policy changes
– The informal sector 
is a problem for all 
industry in different 
domains, though it 
is most noticeable 
in the food 
industries
– Same measure 
adopted for all 
sectors but the 
most active export 
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Components















– Large companies, huge 
investments in 
infrastructure 
– High profit potential as 
mobiles and internet are
becoming essential 
everywhere (size of the 
Egyptian market already
40 million subscribers) 
and return is guaranteed
– High technical expertise
is pre-condition for 
entering the three 
domains
– Small companies 
delivering service to 
public
– High profitability 
especially after decrease
in price of computers
– No prerequisite 
technical knowledge
– Small investments
– High profit potential 
because of high demand
by already huge 
population of mobile 
subscribers
– Minimum technical pre-
qualifications are 
required for entry
Nature and size of the
business community
– Three multinational 
mobile companies 
(MobiNil, Vodafone and 
Itisalat − the first two 
have local partners and 
third is all foreign)
– One fixed phone line 
owned by Telecom 
Egypt (80% public 
company and 20% 
private)
– Tender of second line 
planned 
– Internet (class A, four 
companies; class B, ten
companies)  
– Very large number of 
local private companies 
(class C)
– A large number of 
private investments; 
Egyptian and regional
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Figure A1 Telecommunication licences in Egypt
Source: Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) and the National
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA)
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Features
– Telecommunication under complete 
control of Ministry of Transportation 
and Communication
– Introduction of car mobiles on a 
limited scale
– Early 1990s ‘digital age’ digital 
systems technology introduced (call 
waiting, conference call, hot line etc)
plus prepaid phone booth cards 
– IDSC33 in charge of IT entry in 
Egypt from the angle of supporting 
Cabinet decision-making through 
information access via IT – had full 
authority for internet use in the 
country
– Privatisation of the internet
– In 1998 splitting of ARENTO, the old
public authority in charge of both 
operation and regulation of 
telecommunications in Egypt, into 
Telecom Egypt, a public company 
(specialising in operation only) and a
special division for regulation
– Entry of the two mobile companies 
Mobinil and Vodafone in1996
– Egypt signed agreement in 1997/98 
with WTO and committed itself to 
liberalise sector by 2006 (BTA 
agreement)
– White Paper on development of the 
sector 1998
– First conference on Information era 
1998/99
– Establishment of Ministry of 
Communications and Information 
Technology (MCIT) 1999  
Main players
– The government as 
represented by Minister of 
Transportation and 
Communication (same Minister
in post for 20 years)
– The President’s family
– Initiative of car mobiles 
involved one major investor 
from private sector whose 
name remained significant 




– National private investors 
entering through partnership 
with multinational companies
– Two key players in the 
government: Chairman of 
IDSC and Vice Prime Minister 







33 In 1985, the Cabinet of Egypt established the Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC) whose 
mission was and is to provide information and decision support services to the Cabinet for 
socioeconomic development. A key player in IDSC is the Chairman from 1985−1999, Dr Hisham El-
Sherif, who led the introduction of internet services in Egypt and promoted Egypt’s entry into the 
information age.
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Features Main playersPhases
– Ahmed Nazif is first Minister of MCIT
– The telecommunications law (# 10 in
2003)
– Establishment of the regulatory body
for telecommunications NTRA in 
2003
– Partial privatisation of Telecom 
Egypt. 20% of shares sold to private
sector and exchanged in stock 
market. 80% of Telecom Egypt 
remains public
– Establishment of the Smart Village 
(to include both C and IT institutions 
and investors)
– A new Minister for MCIT is in charge
(Tarek Kamel)
– Old Minister of MCIT promoted to 
PM status
– Entry of a third player in mobile 
phone industry
– Introduction of a second fixed line in 
progress
– Continuation of role of 
multinational companies and 
Egyptian partners




– MCIT and the new Minister
– Telecom Egypt
– NTRA
– Nazif (as Prime Minister)
– New and old multinational 
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Components
All equipment related to CIT,
mainly all kinds of computers,
printers and phone sets and
other equipment  
– This is the part of IT that is 
described as the real IT 
industry
– It focuses on using Oracle 
and Microsoft tools to 
develop software solutions to
be applied on a large scale 
or doing the programming 
for the multinational 
companies themselves  
– Examples of areas of 
application include: 
conversion of old IBM 
applications to modern IT 
technology; preparation of 
generic programs for 
specific functions such as 
automatic archiving, Arabic 
software or development 
tools for multinationals. And 
also specialised Enterprise 
Resource Planning for the 
needs of particular 
manufacturing sectors
Systems integration (hardware
and software services custom-
made to the needs of a
specific project or specific
application – for example
mapping the country,









– Completely imported from 
abroad either fully 
assembled or in parts 
– Local assembly of computer 
parts that is perceived to be 
profitable in the local market
– Limited technical expertise is
needed for entry in the 
assembly line 
– Software development is 
very limited in Egypt (India 
lead there)
– A constraining prerequisite 
is very high programming 
skills and large companies 
with (1000 programmers as 
in the case of India)
– The most understood part of
IT and quite widespread 
– Because it involves complete
and turnkey solutions, 
extended relations with 
customers and servicing are 
critical
– ERPs are financed by IMC
– Intense competition among 
the big players
– Pre-qualification to entry is a
strong technical background 
on different hardware and 
software   
Nature and size of the
business community
– A limited number of 
distributors of imported 
hardware from famous 
worldwide suppliers (such 
as IBM, BP, etc.) 
– Hundreds of small 
companies that assemble 
parts 
– Market is fragmented
– Only 3 to 4 big players 
(300–400 programmers, 
large by Egypt’s standards 
but still small by 
international standards)
– The rest are small 
companies ranging from 1 
to 100 programmers 
– A small number of big 
players
– A large number of feeding 
industries (small enterprises)
that do bits and pieces of 
the work of the big players 
in the project
– All-Egyptian investments
– Represents no less than 
80% of the whole IT market
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processes) − big domain in
India
– Egypt has an advantage in 
call centres because India is
becoming expensive in that 
area and Egyptians have the
advantage of a neutral 
accent – high potential for IT
exports 
– The widespread use of call 
centres in the domestic 
market helps prepare the 
ground for call centres 
aimed at the international 
market. 
– Call centres create an 
employment opportunity for 
fresh graduates plus the 
asset of learning eight 
languages to a fluent level
– Outsourcing of business 
process is still far from being
developed; scope for 
Arabising the contents of 
many applications
– Mostly local companies with
a limited number of foreign 
players
– A small number of 
companies involved in 
export (outsourcing) and 
technical support for 
Microsoft and other 
multinationals (biggest 
Exceed with 4000 
employees)
– There is a large group of 
much smaller call centres 
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Features
– Some scattered initial investments in
IT
– IT definition and extent not clear
– Big focus on hardware in the 1990s 
(selling desktop computers to a 
limited segment of the public)
– Software sales to Egyptian 
community by multinationals with 
heavy counterfeits by all, including 
government entities 
– Continuation of same scattered 
activities as in Phase One
– First conference on Information era 
1998/99
– Establishment of Ministry of 
Communications and Information 
Technology (MCIT) 1999  
– Initiatives by MCIT headed by Nazif 
to promote IT
– Decision like a PC for every 
Egyptian, making PC available at 
very low, extremely affordable prices
– Free internet for all
– No tariff on CIT equipment (in 2004 
went down from 15% to 5%)
– Prepared for establishment of ITIDA
– E-government initiative starting 
under MCIT 
– Training institute to prepare IT 
experts
– Plans for increasing IT exports (plan
for $1.2 billion by 2010)
– ITIDA operational with the objective 
of promoting IT and developing it
– E-government initiative separated 
under its own ministry, Ministry of 
State of Administrative Development
(MSAD) 
– New focus on export of IT 
(particularly call centres) 
Main players
– A very small group of private 
investors
– Same group of key private 
players 
– Multinationals particularly 
Microsoft
– Key private sector players in 
Phases One and Two
– A very small number of new 
players with diversified 
interests in IT
– Hundreds of small companies 
involved in hardware only
– New ministry, MSAD
– ITIDA
– ETEISAL
– Chamber of CIT
– Same group of private sector 
players
– Hundreds of small companies 
involved in hardware and 
support systems and software











IDS RESEARCH REPORT 61
99
Mandate
Strengthen economic and social
development through the provision and
development of communications and
information systems to serve the national
issues that are connected with the reform
and growth of the Egyptian economy and
with raising the standard of living of citizens
and families. Also prepare Egyptian society
to accept and follow up the enormous influx
of developed information and knowledge
and benefit therefrom
Regulate the telecommunications sector,
improve its services and expand the usage
thereof.
NTRA operates in a manner that keeps
pace with state of the art technologies,
satisfies all user needs at the most
reasonable prices and encourages national
and international investments in
telecommunications within a framework of
open competition 
Pave the way for the diffusion of the e-
business services in Egypt, capitalising on
different mandates of the authority as
activating the Egyptian e-signature law and
supporting an export-oriented IT sector in
Egypt.
Mandate I: Activation of the E-Signature
Law
Mandate II: Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights
Mandate III: Support Export-oriented IT
Industry and Skilled Manpower
Enforcement.
Main objectives/functions
1. Supervise the operation of the authorities and 
companies affiliated to the Ministry to guarantee 
their operation on economic bases.
2. Update the administration systems in all authorities 
and companies attached to the Ministry by 
employing the modern administration programs 
used by successful firms worldwide.
3. Establish and develop the institutes and training 
centres to prepare a generation of technical and 
administrative manpower capable of assimilating 
modern technologies.
4. Develop savings funds with the aim of developing 
national savings.
5. Prepare futuristic plans to keep pace with the growth
in local and worldwide demand for communications,
information and postal services.
6. Prepare the programme to attract world industries in
the fields of communications, information and postal
services in order to encourage their presence in 
Egypt alongside deepening local industrialisation.
7. Conclude and maintain international agreements 
related to communications, information and postal 
services, following up their implementation and 
observing the rights and obligations set forth 
therein.
1. Draw up the telecommunications plans and 
programmes. 
2. Prepare and publish the telecommunications 
services statistics. 
3. Set the general policies and regulations for operation
of the telecommunications services.
4. Set the standards and regulations for the non-
economical telecommunications services.
5. Set customer protection rules.
6. Provide state-of-the-art services with the best 
prices.
7. Ensure the quality of telecommunications services.
8. Manage customer complaints 
9. Regulate the licence issuance procedures.
10.Set the National Numbering Plan.
11.Regulate the equipment type approval processes.
1. Issue and renew the licences required for the 
certification service providers (CSPs) in the field of 
e-signature services and electronic transactions.
2. Address complaints and assist in resolving legal 
conflicts related to the use of e-signatures and 
electronic transactions.
3. Offer technical counselling in disputes related to e-
signatures and electronic transactions.
4. Function as the registration centre for original 
computer software produced by organisations or 
individual publishers and producers to protect 
intellectual property and other rights. 
5. Pave the way for the diffusion of the e-government 
and e-business services in Egypt and also to 
support an export-oriented IT industry in Egypt. 
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Features
1) The fact that the telecommunications law does not yet have an executive regulation is heavily 
criticised. Many of the provisions of the law indicate that the guidelines and specific rules 
necessary for its application will be outlined in an executive regulation. The absence of this 
therefore leaves application of the law very unclear.
2) This criticism is strengthened by the fact that the law uses general language and little effort has 
been made to precisely define its terms. This can lead to misinterpretation.
3) Also, the alleged independence of the regulator is questionable. The fact that the regulator and 
the incumbent fixed-line operator both come under the MCIT umbrella is also a matter for 
concern. 
Article 4
The law is vague and many of the articles and provisions can be interpreted in several ways, hence
allowing for varying standards depending on the situation at hand. For example, a provision that
might be used to justify a number of different actions is Article 4(2). It states that the NTRA34 shall
consider protecting national security and top state interests when encouraging investment. The
NTRA could therefore use the ‘national security’ argument to rebut any protests against its
operations or decisions. 
Similarly, Article 4(5) states that the NTRA has the obligation to ‘[monitor] the realization of the
technical and economical efficiency programs for different Telecommunication Services’. The law
does not, however, indicate what these ‘efficiency’ standards are. This allows for selective and
subjective interpretations. 
Article 8
Article 8(8) allows the Board of Directors of the NTRA to accept grants, donations and subsidies
subject to the approval of the military forces.35 The law states in Article 8(8) that the rules for such
acceptance of grants, donations and subsidies are in accordance with the NTRA’s rules and
resolutions in this regard. The fact that the law does not state what these rules and resolutions are
leaves room for favouritism and strategic positioning depending on the donor.
Article 12
This article lists the members of the Board of Directors who manage the NTRA. The pool from which
the applicants are chosen, as listed in the law, may be subject to some criticism. First, the article
shows the extensive involvement of the Minister in the selection process, whereby he can appoint
six members to the Board.
Also, the fact that four representatives of the National Security Entities have seats on the Board
might seem to tilt its functioning more towards national security than telecommunications. 
Article 19
This article requires all entities and companies working in the telecommunication field to provide the
NTRA with reports, statistics or information on all activities except for those relevant to national
security.  
This duty to disclose should have been accompanied by a duty of confidentiality on the part of
NTRA. Also, other exemptions to the duty to disclose, other than those related to national security,
should have been permitted if such disclosure would harm the company in question.
Article 24
According to this article, ‘the Board of Directors shall determine the limits which, if exceeded, shall
result in the occurrence of monopolistic practices in any of the fields regulated by this Law. The
Board of Directors shall set the rules that should be applied to confront such practices’. 
This article seems to supplant the competition authority with the Board of the NTRA in terms of
determining the monopolistic practices that might result out of the application of this law. It also
seems to indicate that the authority of the Board is extended to become a de facto competition
regulatory authority in terms of setting the rules that should be applied to monopolistic practices. 







34 The National Telecommunication Regulatory Authority.
35 The approval provision is listed in Article 44.
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Features
This in turn may be interpreted to mean that the telecommunications sector is not subjected to
the scrutiny of the competition authority and is instead regulated, in terms of competition
compliance, by the Board of the NTRA. 
This may not be the ideal way to ensure fair competition. It may also mean that this sector is
excluded from application of the competition law, which may raise doubts as to whether competition
issues will really be raised. Once competition issues are left to the sectoral regulators, it is hard to
discern whether action or inaction are a result of bias, strategic action, favouritism, or simply inability
to enforce a highly technical market regulatory law. 
Article 26
This article gives the NTRA the right to set the prices of the licenced telecommunications services.
This may be considered price-fixing and hence in violation of the competition law. 
Article 29
This article states that ‘in the event of any dispute arising between Services Providers with regard to
Interconnection agreements between them, such dispute shall be referred to the NTRA in order to
issue a decision therein in accordance with the provisions of such agreements’.
The article goes on to set the guidelines for the NTRA in terms of making such a decision. This
clause may conflict with private contracts that have arbitration clauses. 
Article 34
This article allows the licensee, if necessary, to use the components of another licensee’s
telecommunications network or service, upon agreement amongst them and in return for a fair
charge. However, the article also mandates that should they fail to agree, the matter shall be
brought to the NTRA for arbitration.
This facility-sharing requirement may be deter innovation and might be strategically used by the
NTRA to favour certain licensees over others. No detailed guidelines to this facility-sharing
requirement are listed. This is usually a competition issue that should have been left to the
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The Egyptian Information
Society Initiative (EISI) 2003
– Development of a strong 
CIT sector as a key to 
foster local competitiveness 
in the global arena
– Vision of EISI is delivering 
custom-made services to 
customers with appropriate 
efficiency and allowing them
to participate in the 
decision-making process
– MCIT’s plan geared towards
supporting and empowering
the information society in 
Egypt in close coordination 
with relevant government 
agencies and with the 
private sector 
– These commitments have 
been translated into 
developing and expanding 
the telecommunications 
infrastructure, establishing 
hundreds of information 
centres, expanding the pool
of IT skilled labour and 
creating information systems
and databases among 
government and private 
entities
Strategy 2007/2010
– Continue development of state
of the art CIT infrastructure 
that provides an enabling 
environment for government 
and business throughout Egypt
and links it globally
– To create a vibrant and export-
oriented CIT industry
– To leverage public-private 
partnerships as an 
implementation mechanism 
whenever possible
– To enable society to absorb 
and benefit from expanding 
sources of information
– To create a learning 
community whose members 
have access to all the 
resources and information they
require, regardless of gender 
and location, thus allowing all 
to achieve their full potential 
and play a part in the country’s
socioeconomic development
– To support the development of
the skills required by the CIT 
industry
– To support research and 
innovation in the field of CIT
Table A11 Main objectives of the two official plans for development of CIT
industry and the Egyptian information society initiative (EISI)
National CIT plan 1999
– Upgrade current 
infrastructure
– Create legislative 
environment to 
encourage local and 
foreign investors to 
enter the sector
– Create local demand 
for CIT sector to 
motivate local and 
foreign investors to 
enter the sector
– Target international 
markets by creating a 
competitive CIT sector 
capable of competing 
globally and transform 
the sector into an 
export-led industry in 
order to capture a 
greater share of the 
global market
– Develop qualified HR 
by training 
professionals, skilled 
labour and university 
graduates to develop 
and employ state of 
the art technology





Source: Official documents of MCIT
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